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Presentation of the Working Paper
We are glad to present another issue of the PRINWASS Project Series (SPIPRW). 
The SPIPRW Series has the objective of making available edited materials based on 
the final reports of the PRINWASS Project (www.prinwass.org). This project was carried 
out between 2001 and 2004 and was funded by the European Union’s Fifth Framework 
Programme. PRINWASS is a major landmark for our Network, as WATERLAT-GOBACIT 
was created by a group of PRINWASS partners after the project ended to continue 
working together on the politics of water and water services.
Although some time has passed since the project ended, the topics addressed, and 
the project’s findings have significant relevance and can contribute towards better  
understanding some of the challenges currently facing the implementation of progressive, 
egalitarian water politics. In short, PRINWASS’ main objective was to examine critically 
the policies of privatization of water and sanitation services implemented worldwide 
during the 1990s, looking at specific cases from Africa, Europe and Latin America.  
The project carried out case studies in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, England and Wales, 
Finland, Greece, Kenya, Mexico, and Tanzania, and developed comparative analyses of 
the main findings. Although the original reports were freely available by request, and  
we produced several specific publications based on the project’s findings, much of the 
material remains largely unknown and, for this reason, we launched the SPIPRW Series 
to facilitate the dissemination of research results.
This issue of the WATERLAT-GOBACIT Working Papers features two articles 
presenting edited materials based on the original reports from the case studies carried 
out in Kenya and Tanzania. These two cases provide examples that have important 
lessons for current debates on the privatization of essential public services in developing 
countries, as we currently experience a revival of the water politics implemented 
worldwide in the 1990s, often with complete disregard for the lessons learned from the 
recent past. The two Kenyan cases examined in Article 1 provide excellent information 
about the overall situation of essential water services in the country, and a detailed 
account of the process of privatization launched by the government in the mid-1990s 
with the support of international financial institutions and development agencies. In  
practice, the two cases under consideration in the article, the experiences of Nyeri Town 
and Tala Town, are mostly cases of commercialization of water supply services. Article 
2 discusses the implementation of privatization policies in Tanzania, which took place 
around the same time than in Kenya, and under relatively similar circumstances, with 
a strong presence of international financial institutions and development agencies  
providing support and funding for the required reforms. The article focuses on the 
privatization of the capital city Dar es Salaam's public utility, DAWASA, which was a 
very difficult experience and took almost six years to be completed. Differently from 
the Kenyan cases, where the participating private companies were local, in Dar es 
Salaam there was a strong presence of multinational water companies.
The original reports were written in 2003 and 2004, and therefore the articles contain 
references that may be outdated. We have not updated the information, as the purpose of 
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the publication is to disseminate the original information. We hope that the readers will 
find this material useful and that it may contribute to the work of researchers, students, 
activists, and others in their activities to understand better the internal workings 
and the huge impacts of water privatisation processes. As mentioned earlier, these 
policies are not only very much alive but are also experiencing a worldwide revival. 
Therefore, we believe that the findings and lessons that emerged from the PRINWASS 
Project deserve this publication effort. We wish you all a pleasant and fruitful reading.
Jose Esteban Castro
General Editor and Issue Editor
Newcastle upon Tyne and Buenos Aires, June 2018
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Presentación del Cuaderno de Trabajo 
Presentamos con gusto otro número de la Serie del Proyecto PRINWASS (SPIPRW). 
La Serie SPIPRW tiene el objetivo de facilitar el acceso a materiales editados basados 
en los informes finales del Proyecto PRINWASS (www.prinwass.org). El proyecto fue 
realizado entre 2001 y 2004 y fue financiado por el Quinto Programa Marco de la 
Unión Europea. PRINWASS representa un momento fundante de nuestra Red, ya que 
WATERLAT-GOBACIT fue creada por un grupo de los socios que llevaron adelante 
el Proyecto PRINWASS, quienes una vez finalizado el proyecto decidieron continuar 
trabajando juntos sobre la política del agua y de los servicios básicos de agua y 
saneamiento.
Aunque ha pasado algún tiempo desde el fin del proyecto, los temas y los hallazgos 
del proyecto tienen mucha relevancia hoy y pueden contribuir a la mejor comprensión 
de algunos de los desafíos que confronta la implementación de políticas del agua 
progresistas, igualitarias. En resumen, el principal objetivo de PRINWASS fue el 
de examinar críticamente las políticas de privatización de los servicios básicos de 
agua y saneamiento implementadas internacionalmente durante la década de 1990, 
estudiando casos específicos de África, América Latina y Europa. El proyecto realizó 
estudios de caso en Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Inglaterra y Gales, Finlandia, Grecia, Kenia, 
México y Tanzania, y desarrolló análisis comparativos de los principales resultados. 
Aunque los informes siempre estuvieron disponibles al público a pedido, y aunque 
hemos producido varias publicaciones basadas en los hallazgos del proyecto, buena 
parte del material sigue siendo desconocido, por lo cual hemos creado la Serie SPIPRW 
para contribuir a la diseminación de los resultados de investigación.
Este número de los Cuadernos de Trabajo WATERLAT-GOBACIT incluye dos 
artículos que presentan materiales editados basados en los informes originales de los 
estudios de caso realizados en Kenia y Tanzania. Los dos casos suministran ejemplos 
que contienen lecciones importantes acerca de la privatización de servicios públicos 
esenciales en países en desarrollo, ya que en estos momentos experimentamos una 
reedición de las políticas del agua que fueron implementadas en la década de 1990, 
con frecuencia sin prestar atención a las lecciones aprendidas del pasado reciente. 
Los dos casos de Kenia examinados en el Artículo 1 proveen información excelente 
sobre la situación general de los servicios de agua y saneamiento en el país, con un 
informe detallado del proceso de privatización lanzado por el gobierno a mediados 
de la década de 1990 con el apoyo de las instituciones financieras y agencias de 
desarrollo internacionales. En la práctica, los dos casos considerados en el artículo, las 
experiencias de Nyeri Town y Tala Town, son principalmente casos de 
mercantilización de servicios de provisión de agua. El Artículo 2 discute la 
implementación de políticas de privatización en Tanzania, que fueron iniciadas 
aproximadamente al mismo tiempo que en Kenia, y bajo circunstancias 
relativamente similares, con una fuerte presencia de instituciones financieras y 
agencias de desarrollo internacionales. El artículo trata el caso de la privatización de la 
empresa pública de la capital Dar es Salaam, DAWASA, que fue una experiencia muy 
dificultosa y tomó casi seis años en ser concluida. A diferencia de los casos de Kenia, 
en los que las empresas privadas participantes eran locales, en Dar es Salaam se dio 
una fuerte presencia de empresas de agua multinacionales.     
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Los informes originales fueron escritos en 2003 y 2004 y, por lo tanto, los artículos 
contienen referencias que pueden estar desactualizadas. No hemos actualizado la 
información, ya que el propósito de la publicación es diseminar la información original. 
Esperamos que los lectores encuentren este material de utilidad y que pueda contribuir 
al trabajo de investigadores, estudiantes, activistas, y otros actores, en búsqueda de una 
mejor comprensión de la dinámica interna y de los enormes impactos de los procesos de 
privatización. Como se mencionó previamente, estas políticas no solamente continúan 
existiendo, sino que están experimentando un renacimiento a nivel mundial. Por lo 
tanto, consideramos que los resultados y lecciones que surgieron del Proyecto 
PRINWASS merecen este esfuerzo de publicación. Les deseamos una placentera y 
fructífera lectura. 
José Esteban Castro
Editor General y del Número
Newcastle upon Tyne y Buenos Aires, junio de 2018
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Article 1
The experience of Kenya1
Ezekiel Nyangeri Nyanchaga2 - Department of Civil Engineering, University of Nairobi, 
Nairobi, Kenya. 
Abstract
The article discusses the implementation of privatization policies in the Kenyan water 
and sanitation sector in the late 1990s. It addresses the decision taken by the Kenyan 
Government, with support from the international financial institutions, to introduce 
reforms aimed at commercializing the provision of water and sanitation services, 
including the transfer of management and operation activities to private companies. 
The article provides information about the overall situation of water and sanitation 
services in the country and presents results from two case studies involving 
different experiences of private sector participation, in the towns of Nyeri and Tala. 
It extracts lessons and discusses positive and negative results, implications and 
prospects of privatization of essential public services in Kenya.
Keywords: Water and sanitation, privatization, essential public services, Nyeri Town, 
Tala Town, Kenya
Received:  October 2017 Accepted: April 2018
1 The article is based on results from the PRINWASS research project, which was supported by 
the European Commission under the Fifth Framework Programme 1998-2002, Contract: PL ICA4-2001-
10041 (www.prinwass.org)..
2 E-mail: enyangeri@uonbi.ac.ke. 
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Resumen
El artículo discute la implementación de políticas de privatización en el sector de 
servicios de agua y saneamiento en Kenia, a finales de la década de 1990. Aborda la 
decisión tomada por el Gobierno de Kenia, con apoyo de las instituciones financieras 
internacionales, de introducir reformas orientadas a la mercantilización de la provisión 
de servicios de agua y saneamiento, incluyendo la transferencia de actividades de 
gestión y operación a empresas privadas. El artículo suministra información sobre la 
situación general de los servicios de agua y saneamiento en el país y presenta resultados 
de dos estudios de caso con diversas experiencias de participación privada en las 
ciudades de Nyeri y Tala. El trabajo extrae lecciones y discute resultados, implicaciones 
y posibilidades positivos y negativos de las políticas de privatización de servicios 
públicos esenciales en Kenia.
Palabras clave: Agua y saneamiento, privatización, servicios públicos esenciales, Nyeri 
Town, Tala Town, Kenia
Recibido: octubre de 2017 Aceptado: abril de 2018
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Introduction
Kenya has been characterized by inequitable patterns of land ownership, a high 
population growth rate, rural-urban migration, poorly planned urbanization, deforestation, 
low literacy level, low domestic product growth and high levels of unemployment. The 
country’s economic performance was deteriorating, and the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rate fell from 4.8 percent in 1995 to 1.8 percent in 1998. In 2001 Kenya’s 
population was estimated at 32 million people, of whom 65 percent lived in the rural 
areas and the rest in urban centres. Over 60 percent of the urban population lived in 
unplanned (slum) settlements, lacking enough infrastructure to facilitate the delivery of 
water and sanitation services (WSS). Access to safe water was estimated to cover 70 
percent of the population in urban centres and 48 percent in rural areas, whereas access 
to sanitation services in urban centres was estimated at 65 percent, as compared to 40 
percent in rural areas. However, overall coverage had been declining in terms of quality, 
quantity, reliability and the nature of access (MWRMD, 2003). 
The Government had adopted long, medium and short-term policies to reverse these 
trends. The long-term policy framework was formulated in the 1996 Sessional Paper No 
2 (Government of Kenya, 1996b), which focused on Industrial Transformation targets for 
2020, and in the National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) 1999-2015 (Government of 
Kenya, 1999). The former attempted to lay the foundation for transforming Kenya into a 
Newly Industrialized Country (NIC) by the year 2020, while the latter provided a national 
policy and institutional framework for actions against poverty. The medium-term 
policy framework was contained in the Eighth National Development Plan 1997-2001 
(Government of Kenya, 1996a). The Plan focused on raising economic growth and 
investment levels, promoting export-oriented industries, and restructuring the role 
of government to focus on providing an enabling environment for economic growth. 
Kenya’s short-term policy framework was outlined in the Policy Framework Papers 
(PFP), and in the government’s annual budget statements.
In relation to WSS, the national government has already recognized that the poor 
provision of WSS services has impacted negatively on the country’s economic 
development and the wellbeing of the population. With support from international 
institutions like the World Bank, the government has been working on the 
implementation of reforms to improve the provision of WSS through the promotion 
of private sector participation (PSP) by introducing commercial approaches, 
including privatization. This article addresses the process of reform between the 
mid-1990s and 2002 and examines the prospects for future development. The first 
section discusses the process of reform, while the second and third sections present 
the results of two case studies: the introduction of PSP reforms in Nyeri Town and Tala 
Town. A fourth section discusses the main findings, and I close the article with brief 
Conclusions.
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The privatization process of water and sanitation services in Kenya
The Ministry of Water Resources Management and Development (MWRMD), formerly 
the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MENR), is the trustee of all water 
resources in the country. The present key roles and functions of the MWRMD include 
water policy formulation, water resources management policy, apportionment of water 
resources and abstraction licensing, appointment of water undertakers, regulation, 
setting and approval of standards, approval of water tariffs, levies, rates and charges, 
development and operation and management of urban and rural water supply systems, 
wastewater treatment and control, water quality and pollution control, catchment area 
conservation, overseeing water conservation by the National Water Conservation and 
Pipeline Corporation (NWCPC), irrigation and dam construction schemes, and flood 
control and land reclamation. The MWRMD’s responsibilities include granting rights for 
“water undertakings”, that is, the right to provide water and sanitation services (WSS), to 
public agencies or private entities (MWRMD, 2003a).
At present there are over 1549 water supply systems in Kenya managed by various 
agencies. The MWRMD, which is both the largest provider and the main regulator for 
WSS, the NWCPC, a para-state company created in 1988 to take over from the Ministry 
WSS that could be run on a commercial basis3, the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG), 
and Local Authorities (LA) are the main actors in water service provision, covering 74 
percent of the served population. The MWRMD runs over 600 rural water systems 
of which 200 systems are gazetted for revenue collection. The NWCPC runs over 48 
water systems, 45 of which are gazetted.  Other actors include River Basin Authorities, 
Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) self-help groups, various institutes and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), which operate and maintain their own water supply 
systems. Local authorities provide sewerage services in municipalities and urban areas. 
Communities together with self-help groups and NGOs run more than 865 systems and 
LAs run eight systems. These systems together supply water services to a total of about 
18.6 million people, which represents an average service coverage of 59 per cent of the 
estimated total population of 31.6 million people in 2003. Table No 1 provides a general 
overview of the country’s main providers of WSS.
3 Note of the editor: as explained later in the report, at the time of the study the NWCPC was not 
autonomous and was still operating as part of the MWRMD.
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Table N° 1: Number of water supply systems in Kenya by service provider and population served.
Service provider/producer Number Population served (millions)
Ministry of Water Resources Management and 
Development 628 6.1
National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation 48 3.7
Local authorities 8 3.9
Communities 356
4.9Non-governmental organizations 266
Self-help water supply systems 243
TOTAL 1549 18.6
Source: World Bank, 2000 and MWRMD, 2003a.
Some of these actors are mainly concerned with policies, others with implementation, 
operation and maintenance while some have multiple roles, which have led to 
contradictions in the sector. Other actors indirectly involved in the water sector include 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry of Health (MOH), the Kerio Valley 
Development Authority (KVDA), the Tana River Development Authority (TARDA), the 
Lake Basin Development Authority (LBDA), the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), as well as 
some private companies. Figure No 1 and Table No 2 describe in more detail the present 
institutional framework for water services in Kenya.
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Figure N° 1: Institutional framework for water services management in Kenya
          Source: MWRMD, 2003a.
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Table N° 2: Main providers of water and sanitation services in Kenya (c. 2000).
MWRMD
At the end of 2000, the Ministry operated 73 piped urban water 
supply systems serving 1.4 million people. In addition, it also 
operated 555 piped water supply systems in rural areas serving 
4.7 million people.
NWCPC
Operates piped water systems in 21 urban centres serving a 
population of about 2.2 million, and 14 large piped water supply 
systems in rural areas serving 1.5 million people
Local Authorities Ten gazetted major local authorities operate their own WSS sys-tems covering a population of about 3.9 million people.
Municipal Departments
These departments, lacking financial autonomy, provide WSS in 
Nairobi, (160,000 connections serving 2.25 million people) and 
Kisumu (11,000 connections serving 345,000 people).
Self-help groups
These groups operate about 355 piped water supply systems in 
urban and rural areas serving about 2.3 million people. They also 
run about 10,000 water points serving 2.6 million people. Most 
are registered with the Ministry of Culture and Social services, 
but a few have established themselves as legal entities under the 
“Societies Act”.
Private Sector Participation
Small Scale Independent 
Providers (SSIPs)
SSIPs provide substitute WSS to all categories of customers. In 
Nairobi’s formal settlements, SSIPs typically finance and operate 
boreholes equipped with mechanized pumps, small distribution 
networks, and water tankers. They obtain a water abstraction 
permit, but rarely a water-vending license. In informal settlements, 
SSIPs operate mostly water kiosks or vend small water 
quantities (20 to 25-litre jerrycans or 80 to 100-litre drums).
Management contracts
In Malindi, a management contract developed from a service 
contract, that is, an “Improvement in Billing and Revenue 
Collection” contract, that was funded from the Second Mombasa 
and Coastal Water Supply Project (financed by the World Bank), 
which ran from 1995 to December 1997.
Privatization In towns such as Nyeri, Tala, and Eldoret, some aspects of water supply services have been transferred to private companies.
Other private water 
companies
Mae Properties, the owners of Runda Coffee Estates, developed 
the first 200 housing units between 1972 and 1974. The Nairobi 
City Council, the Ministry of Works and the Ministry of Local 
Government granted Mae Properties the authority to form a private 
water supply company namely: Runda Water Company Ltd, as the 
Nairobi City Council was unable to supply water to the new estate 
at that time.  By 2001, the Company supplied water to over 500 
residents of Runda Estate in the suburbs of the City of Nairobi.
Source: BG Associates, 2002.
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From the above background, it can be concluded that the Government has constructed 
most of the public water supply systems in Kenya. Consequently, the management and 
operation of the waterworks has been organized as government departments, which 
means that a politically appointed head implements the general policy and ensures the 
day-to-day operation and management. 
Overview of WSS performance
The provision of water and sanitation services WSS in Kenya has suffered from 
mismanagement and general decline, leading to public outcry owing to the bad quality 
of the services. Therefore, the water sector is facing enormous challenges, and the 
Government has already recognized that the provision of WSS is poor, and that this has 
impacted negatively on the economic development of the country by affecting major 
sectors that include health, industry and commerce. A major problem is the fact that 
women and children dedicate much of their available time searching for water, leaving 
them with limited opportunities for learning and productive activities. These issues 
have contributed to increase poverty levels in the country (MWRMD, 2003).
The current role of the MWRMD as the primary service provider and principal regulator 
has undermined the performance of the sector. Implementing the proposed Reform 
will require large financial resources for capital investment and technical assistance. 
The Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation study funded by the World Bank (BG 
Associates, 2002), found out that the services were of poor quality. Unreliable service 
is now recognized as a pattern for most piped systems in the country. Because of a 
limited focus on comprehensive water resources management (WRM), many water 
supply systems face uncertainty regarding the availability and quality of water, 
especially during drought years. Lack of investment in maintenance has resulted in the 
collapse of the WSS infrastructure, specially distribution networks, sewers, connections, 
and meters; hence, there is a need for massive rehabilitation everywhere. There is, 
therefore, a lack of “best practices” in WSS. Schemes managed by private firms report 
relatively good management in terms of revenue collection, and financial operation 
and maintenance management. However, the lack of adequate facilities, equipment, 
and skilled technical manpower, in practice means that PSP projects perform poorly 
in terms of staff productivity (BG Associates, 2002). WSS managed by the MWRMD 
and the NWCPC have the poorest records for operation and maintenance performance. 
Materials and spare parts for repair of WSS facilities are never availed in time. Reporting 
and documentation of Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and related activities is either 
improperly done or not done at all. WSS experience high unaccounted for water figures, 
and frequent bursts and leakages that take long before they are repaired. This may 
be attributed to the existence of large bureaucracies, and unavailability of resources. 
Revenue generated from the sale of water is never ploughed back into the systems. 
The employees of WSS are poorly remunerated and, therefore, lack working morale (BG 
Associates, 2002). 
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The National WSS strategy paper published by the MWRMD recognizes that one 
of the key serious weaknesses in the water sector has been the absence of demand 
management, which is related to a range of problems, including:
• centralized decision making
• political interference
• weak institutional framework leading to poor coordination between sector
institutions, and unclear definition of roles often leading to conflicts
• lack of linkage between water supply and sanitation services
• wastage of resources and duplication of efforts
• low accountability of water-undertakers
• absence of transparency in financial management
• lack of regulation and enforcement
• overstaffing and wrong deployment of staff
• inadequate management and financial skills to operate WSS commercially
• low revenues and capital investment
• lack of monitoring and evaluation of the systems
• tariffs that do not encourage consumers to respond to increased water usage
• service levels that are not adapted to consumer needs
• poor design, operation, maintenance, and repair of facilities
• large quantities of unaccounted for water (UFW – over 50 percent), partly due to
illegal connections, water theft, and leakage (MWRMD, 2003).
These and other problems inevitably result in an inability to diagnose faults, suggest 
how they may be corrected, or anticipate problems. For example, water demand already 
exceeds the capacity of most suppliers. The predominant thinking among water utilities 
tends to promote supply-side solutions such as extending or building new water 
infrastructure to provide additional capacity for meeting the rising demand. It is common 
sense that if the capacity to supply is decreasing then the time when a new construction 
is required will occur at an earlier date than originally planned. Also, water shortages 
affecting consumers caused by excessive leakage often result in intermittent supply, 
which in turn causes low or even negative pressures in parts of the distribution system. 
When these conditions occur, there is a danger of pollution being drawn into the system 
through defective pipes, joints and fittings. Under normal practice, a good management 
approach would ensure that positive mains pressures are maintained and that the 
system is kept in a sound condition to prevent or eliminate any chances of pollution. For 
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example, detecting illegal connections to the mains, often made by unskilled people, or 
otherwise tampering with the system, can result in pollution of the system and the loss 
of revenue.  A good management practice is to track down illegal connections and take 
the necessary discouraging action so that pollution from this source does not recur, but 
this is not the case.
Water undertakings attempting to achieve financial self-sufficiency derive most of 
their income from the sale of water. When there is a reduction in their ability to meet 
demand, there will be a reduction in income. Furthermore, a water utility that cannot 
maintain the required output of water is unlikely to be effective in collecting revenues. 
A reduction in revenue may be acceptable if there is a corresponding reduction in 
expenditure. In order to achieve financial self-sufficiency, there must be a generation of 
revenue that will equal the total of the fixed and variable costs. This break-even point will 
occur at a pre-determined level of sales, but there will be deficit if the revenue is lower 
than the break-even level of sales. Long-term self-sufficiency requires a financial surplus 
whereby the revenue exceeds the break-even level, as this is needed to compensate 
for the periods of deficit while demand is growing, and to build up reserves to provide 
for future replacements (Franklin, 1983). However, this is unlikely to happen under the 
prevailing conditions of poor management.
The records of staff employed in the water sector also indicate the existence of 
serious problems. The MWRMD employs 7,200 people, the NWCPC 1,400 people, and 
Local Authorities and their autonomous WSS companies and additional 3,700 people. 
The average staffing ratio is 12.2 persons per thousand connections. Other African 
countries have an average of 8 persons per 1,000 connections, with the best 
performance 
being at less than 4 persons per 1,000 connections for operations of similar size. 
WSS operations in large cities and the NWCPC and the MWRMD employ 
competent technical staff, many of them trained at the Kenya Water Institute 
(KEWI), under the MWRMD, however, this is not the case everywhere. Also, to 
some extent the poor performance recorded in the WSS sector results from 
its inability to attract competent financial managers with compensation packages 
that compare with that of the private sector.
Other indicators of poor management related to staff, which are common in most 
water utilities in the country, are:
• high accident rate
• rising sickness and absenteeism
• inadequate training of staff concerned with the management and operation of
waterworks, leading to inefficient operation
• lack of evaluation of the effectiveness of the training provided (lack of evidence
of improvements in performance resulting from staff training)
• staff standards of training tend to be overstated
• relevant and effective training is not always provided.
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There are significant impacts derived from the problems identified with the training of 
staff and poor management, including:
• repair costs tend to increase when the utilities fail to run services properly
• preventive maintenance is neglected, or done badly, which is particularly important 
in the more expensive emergency breakdowns that also tend to adversely affect
service delivery
• energy wastage, with the attendant costs.
Breakdowns, energy waste and similar problems can push up costs so that breaking 
even becomes unattainable. Breakdowns also reduce revenue, although there can be 
partial breakdowns which do not affect service quality or energy use. Basic data on 
WSS is always available from operators’ record books. However, these records are 
seldom used by operators for situational analysis or forecasting. Such an exercise 
would help in forward planning by identifying problems and providing appropriate 
solutions when they can be anticipated.
Tariff, billing and revenue collection
The official tariffs for domestic water supply4 range from KSh 20 to 100 (US$ 0.26 to 
1.30) per m3. The average tariff is KSh 30 (US$ 0.4) per m3. The sewerage tariff is 
charged to metered water consumers and is based on the amount of water used. The 
rate is set at 50-100 percent of the water tariff rate. However, the sewerage tariff rates are 
not cost-based and, therefore, do not cover the whole costs of construction of facilities 
and operation and maintenance. The sewerage charge is normally added to the water 
supply bill, although this is not easy to implement where the suppliers of water and 
sewerage services are different utilities.
One of the problems identified in recent assessments is that the inefficient cross-
subsidies among geographical areas have distorted consumption and encouraged 
wastage and hampered proper maintenance of facilities in the subsidized areas. Also, 
owing to the poor quality of piped WSS, customers must rely on costly substitutes. Thus, 
households spend about KSh 240 (US$ 3.16) per m3 when considering not only the bill 
for piped water but also the additional expenses they incur by buying water from kiosks 
or tankers for personal consumption, which is 2.3 times higher than the highest piped 
tariff for water supply. The situation is worse for those families that rely exclusively on 
water kiosks or other private vendors, as they pay, on average, KSh 380 (US$ 5) per m3 
and KSh 845 (US$ 11.1) per m3, respectively (BG Associates, 2002; Nippon Koei, 1998). 
That is, these users pay 3.8 times more, in the case of water kiosks, and 8.4 times more 
in the case of other vendors, than the highest tariff for piped water supply. 
There is a range concerns about tariffs, b illing and debt collection that have been 
identified, most of which are also related to the problems discussed above in relation to 
4 These figures correspond approximately to the period 2002-2002. The exchange rate considered 
was 76 Kenyan Schillings (KSs) per 1 US$.
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the performance of WSS. These issues include inadequacies in customer registration 
and records, meter installation, repair, and reading, billing and revenue collection, and 
user connection, disconnection and reconnection. In addition to problems mentioned 
earlier, it is worth highlighting the following: 
• tariffs that are too low (unmetered consumption; use of inadequate flat rates)
• inappropriate tariff structures
• failure to invoice customers
• inadequate debt recovery from the commercial and industrial sectors
• customers unwillingness to pay owing to their dissatisfaction with the quality of
WSS.
Operation and Maintenance
Over 57 percent of the water supply systems operated by the MWRMD and the 
NWCPC are affected by intermittence, and 90 percent run less than 12 hours a day. 
Among the key reasons identified for this situation are the deterioration and failure of 
infrastructure, lack of compliance by operation and maintenance staff, partial closure 
of operations to cut costs in the use of chemicals and electric power supply, and 
seasonal water shortages in the dry season (Nippon Koei, 1998). Proper recording of 
water distributed, and actual consumption is critical to ascertain the efficiency of WSS, 
including the identification of unaccounted for water (UFW). However, the flow control 
and metering systems used by the MWRMD and the NWCPC are very poor, resulting 
in low recovery of water charges and complaints from the consumers. Many bulk 
meters are malfunctioning due to poor maintenance. The Water Supply Sector Survey 
revealed that more than 20 percent of urban consumers and 40 percent in rural 
areas are unmetered (Nippon Koei, 1998). In addition, water quality control is rarely 
practized, and there is no periodical water quality analysis in the sector. Major urban 
WSS have their own laboratories and test water quality to determine appropriate 
chemical dosing levels and monitor the treatment process, but there are very few 
pieces of equipment and these are mostly defective.
The situation of sanitation services is dire. According to the results of the household 
survey, about 50 percent of the people who receive piped water supply use pit latrines 
for excreta disposal. Also, almost 47 percent of the urban population use unimproved 
pit latrines that are considered unacceptable for hygienic reasons. Approximately 23 
percent of the total urban population use water-borne toilet facilities connected to a 
septic tank or cesspit. Most septic tanks discharge effluent into a soak-away pit or 
drainage tiles located on the building plot. Generally septic tanks generally are not 
properly maintained which leads to clogging of the soak-away pits (Nippon Koei, 1998).
In relation to sewerage services, operation and maintenance of these systems has 
always been ignored and very little attention is given to effluent quality control. Some 
of the sewage treatment works are either neglected or abandoned, although sewage is 
still pumped into the plants (BG Associates, 2002). Sewers for domestic and industrial 
wastewater are separate from sewers for storm water drainage. Sewer management 
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authorities lack the basic sewer inspection programmes that are needed to collect data. 
The average per capita length of sewers installed in urban centres is 1.4 m, which is too 
low and indicates poor service coverage. This conclusion is supported by the relatively 
high number of persons per sewer connection (house lateral) recorded in the survey of 7 
urban centres, which is over 30 persons per sewer connection. Newly constructed sewers 
are generally in good working order despite a general lack of preventive maintenance 
such as regular cleaning and inspection. Trunk sewers are usually oversized to provide 
spare capacity for future flows. Unfortunately, in many cases, projected wastewater flows 
have not materialized because of water rationing or the unwillingness of consumers to 
connect to sewers. As a result, flows are too low to provide self-cleansing velocities. 
Low flows lead to operating problems such as accumulation of sediments. Most sewers 
were constructed between the 1950s and 70s and have never been inspected. Local 
experience indicates that many of them are in poor structural condition.  In several 
urban centres, the trunk sewers installed in central areas over twenty years ago are only 
150 mm in diameter. Urban growth has exceeded the available hydraulic capacity of 
older sewers resulting in frequent blockages, overflows and surface flooding (Nippon 
Koei, 1998).
According to the same survey, these problems are also reflected in the situation of 
wastewater treatment and effluent disposal. The older wastewater treatment works, 
built in the 1980s, are overloaded owing to the pressures of population growth that 
went beyond the capacity originally designed, the reduction in treatment capacity due 
to sludge accumulation or mechanical failure, and ageing sewers resulting in more 
infiltration of ground and surface water. Wastewater stabilization ponds are used in 25 
out of 38 facilities. Generally, these provide problem-free operation with the exception 
that most of the older ponds are filling with sludge and vegetation that generally reduce 
retention times and therefore, treatment efficiency. The remaining treatment works use 
conventional processes such as biological growth filters, oxidation ditches, or aerated 
lagoons. In general, most of the recently constructed sewage works are operating far 
below their intended design capacity. The low flow rates can be attributed to low rate 
of sewer connections and inadequate water supply systems resulting in low per capita 
water consumption. A sampling programme of existing 20 wastewater treatment plants 
showed that only two treatment works met the required National Effluent Standard of 
20 mg/l BOD55. On average, the influent BOD5 was strong at most treatment works 
indicating that individual water consumption was low. All treatment works met the 
National Effluent Standard of 5,000 faecal coliform counts per 100ml and only two 
treatment works exceeded the limit proposed in the study. COD6 values ranged from 
medium to strong indicating that there was potentially a large component of untreated 
industrial liquid waste being discharged into public sewers. Effluent’s COD in all cases 
exceed the national standards (Nippon Koei, 1998).
In Kenya, all wastewater treatment effluent is discharged into an inland stream or lake 
except for Mombasa, where uncontrolled and untreated sewage is discharged into the 
Indian ocean. Homa Bay and Kisumu urban centres discharge high BOD5 and nutrient 
rich wastewater directly into Lake Victoria, and Nakuru and Naivasha discharge treated 
effluent into the sensitive ecosystems of lakes Nakuru and Naivasha respectively). 
A sampling study undertaken during the same survey in the receiving streams at 20 
5 Biological Oxygen Demand measured over 5 days.
6 Chemical Oxygen Demand.
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wastewater treatment facilities provided insight into water quality issues. In 10 cases, 
the BOD5 of the receiving watercourse upstream of the treatment plant was higher 
than the effluent standard of 20 mg/l, indicating a significant contribution from other 
sources of pollution upstream. At 10 treatment works, the BOD5 downstream of the 
treatment plant was lower than the BOD5 upstream. This result appears to indicate that 
the effluent was diluted in the natural watercourse. In general, where public sewerage 
systems exist, industries usually discharge their effluents into the sewers. Enforcement 
of the National Trade Effluent Standards is the responsibility of the MWRMD, but the 
Ministry is severely crippled by lack of resources to inspect industries and monitor, 
collect and analyse data. The continued uncontrolled disposal of industrial wastewater 
has degraded the water environment around large urban centres and could seriously 
jeopardize the quality of drinking water supplies, making it difficult to treat and provide 
safe potable water (Nippon Koei, 1998).
The Operation and Maintenance practices of sewerage systems vary widely from one 
urban centre to the next, depending on the level of funding available, management and 
staffing. In several urban centres, sewerage systems are working below capacity due to 
water rationing and blocking of sewers. Sewers are not inspected or cleaned regularly 
and there appears to be no efforts to prevent conditions that will eventually lead to more 
serious and costly maintenance problems. Except for the newer facilities, most sewage 
treatment facilities have either fallen into serious disrepair or are non-operational and 
beyond repair (Nippon Koei, 1998). Maintenance requirements for waste stabilization 
ponds are very simple, but they are neglected. Although the treatment process is not 
immediately affected, the pond environment will suffer, leading to odours, flies and 
mosquitoes. There is a lack of control and monitoring at most wastewater treatment 
works, although these treatment plants require constant monitoring and process 
adjustments in order to provide the intended performance.
The reforms to promote commercialization and privatization
The government has been under pressure to privatize WSS in major towns. Though 
this has not been fully implemented, there have been some steps taken towards this 
direction. The government indicated a willingness to commercialize/privatize the 
water and sanitation sector in 1986 through the Sessional Paper No.1 on “Economic 
Management for Renewed Growth” that recommended the commercialization of WSS 
by suggesting decentralization of these services from local authorities (Government of 
Kenya, 1986). At the same time local authorities were urged to revise the pricing of utilities 
and services to reflect the real cost of operation, maintenance, and long-term capital 
stock replacement. In 1987, the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ), which 
was supporting water and sanitation projects in Kenya in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Local Government, formed the Water and Sewerage Operation Unit (WSOU) with the 
overall goal of ensuring that WSS in selected municipalities were self-sustaining. The 
WSOU project had two preparatory phases (Phases I and II), which run from July 1987 
to December 1993 in pilot municipalities, where a framework for financial management 
of WSS was developed. The third phase (1994-1996) of the project led to the creation of 
the Urban Water and Sanitation Management (UWASAM) initiative, aimed at assisting 
local authorities to achieve sustainability for their WSS through commercialization and 
privatization. It was recognized that if financial viability were to be attained, financial 
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autonomy from the municipal councils would be required. Nine municipalities, namely, 
Kisumu, Kericho, Kitale, Nyahururu, Nakuru, Eldoret, Thika, Nanyuki, and Nyeri Municipal 
Councils were identified as pilot towns for implementation of the process. A workshop 
was held in 1995 between the pilot towns, the Ministry of Land Reclamation, Regional 
and Water Development, and the GTZ to review the process of commercialization of 
WSS, and it was resolved that the pilot local authorities should form Water and Sewerage 
Companies as the next step in the commercialization process. Thus, UWASAM focused 
its interest on assisting local authorities to form fully fledged and autonomous Water 
and Sanitation Departments (WSD), which would have a general manager, a commercial 
manager, and a separate bank account. UWASAM supported the staff of the Ministry of 
Local Government by employing full-time financial consultants and an expatriate water 
manager. 
Although the creation of the WSDs brought some improvements to WSS, it soon 
became apparent that certain problems were inherent within the local government 
structure and that the creation of separate departments within that structure could not 
provide a solution. It was realized that despite the measures put in place, the provision 
of WSS by local authorities was far from being self-sustaining, while services were 
severely affected by a range of problems, which we consider in more detail in the next 
section. As a result, in April 1996, the Ministry of Local Government accepted, in principle, 
the need for introducing a commercial approach to WSS. This decision was articulated 
during UWASAM’s Phase IV (1997-1999), when several options were considered. The 
favoured choice was the adoption of a model combining public sector ownership with 
private operation and management. A decision was taken to implement the project 
on a pilot basis in four municipalities, which subsequently launched commercial WSS 
utilities: Nyeri Town in July 1998, Kitale and Eldoret in September 1999, and Nakuru in 
July 20007. The new WSS utilities were fully owned by the municipalities, and were 
established under the Companies’ Act, Chapter 486. A corporate management team 
ran these companies, comprising a Managing Director, a Commercial Manager, and 
a Technical Manager, who were all accountable to a Board of Directors. These WSS 
utilities were unique in Kenya, in that each has only one shareholder: their respective 
local authorities. Other institutions concerned with their operation became stakeholders. 
However, the duties and responsibilities of the directors of the utilities were like the 
duties and responsibilities of directors of commercial companies, requiring compliance 
with good Corporate Governance practices and the enhancement of productivity in 
the organizations. The Ministry of Local Government and GTZ, within the framework 
of the UWASAM project, provided technical and financial support. UWASAM’s Phase 
V (January 2000-June 2003) continued with the creation of more pilot WSS utilities in 
Kericho, Kisumu, and Nyahururu in 2002, and the introduction of macro-level activities.
However, the UWASAM project experienced considerable implementation difficulties 
and had limited impact. Among other reasons, councillors and chief officers of local 
authorities, the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources all feared the implications of the changes introduced to promote the 
autonomy of WSS, which could lead to unpredictable situations, loss of jobs and other 
potentially negative outcomes (UWASAM, 2001). In fact, from the first group of four 
WSS utilities created between 1998 and 2000, only the Nyeri and Eldoret companies 
7 Kericho, Nyeri and Eldoret Water and Sanitation Companies were registered in the Register of 
Companies between September and October 1997, but their operation started at later dates.
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remained operational by the beginning of 2002. The Department of Water Development 
decided to take over the Kitale and Nakuru WSS operations due to the poor performance 
of the commercialized companies.
The lack of an integrated water policy in the country was in principle remedied when 
the new National Policy on Water Resources Management and Development was 
launched (Government of Kenya, 1999b). The policy included the commercialization of 
rural and urban water supply under the guiding principle of total cost recovery from 
users. Other aspects of government policy were more clearly articulated in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (Government of Kenya, 1999a). However, this does not mean 
that the present policies are appropriate, comprehensive and consistent in all its 
intentions and proposed actions. The new water legislation and reform plans may also 
to some extent contradict the policy intentions. There are uncertainties over regulatory 
policy and separation from undue political influences (specific uncertainties are that of 
price setting and licensing issues). The National Water Policy clearly advocates for the 
decentralization of WSS. However, very limited decentralization has so far taken place. 
The MWRMD is still operating most WSS and when one considers that the NWCPC is 
still an arm of the MWRMD, most water supply systems are thus still run by state or 
quasi-state organizations.
Water sector legislation in Kenya has been fragmented and outdated but has recently 
been partly amended. The previous Water Act Cap 372 dating originally back to 1952 but 
amended in 1962 and 1972 was substantially revised and amended in 2002 (Government 
of Kenya, 2002). The Water Act 2002 still has its weaknesses, but a bigger problem 
than inadequate legislation and regulations is poor enforcement and compliance. If 
the Water Act 2002 ultimately provides the enabling environment for a simple and 
straightforward methodology for developing regulatory and institutional procedures, 
then many potential legal issues and hurdles could be resolved. The Water Act 
2002 creates two statutory bodies, that is, the Water Resources Management Authority 
that is responsible for catchment management, water apportionment, pollution control 
and the enforcement of laws relating to water resources management; and the Water 
Services Regulatory Board (WSRB), which is the licensing body and economic regulator. 
Under the Act this regulatory board is an autonomous body with responsibility for 
regulating water and sewerage services in the country. The problem with the Water 
Act is that all the critical interventions in areas susceptible to monopoly power abuse 
appear to be totally emasculated. For instance, section 47 (g) of the Act only give the 
regulator the power “to develop guidelines for the fixing of tariffs for the provision of 
water services” whereas section 73(1) permits the WSBs to regulate themselves as “a 
licensee [that] shall make regulations for or with respect to conditions for the provision 
of water services and the tariffs applicable”. It should be made clear that a system of 
water and sewerage services that have public interest issues in respect to matters of 
safety, cost, access and availability cannot be permitted to regulate itself.
Tariffs or any other decisions of the WSBs are subject to approval by the WSRB, but 
there are no specific legal tests the Board can apply for to accept or reject a set of 
tariffs or regulations. Even if the WSRB were to develop guidelines for tariff setting, the 
guidelines would not have the force of law and could easily be contested or rejected by 
licensees (WSBs) or their agents, the water service providers (Mwangi and Gitau, 2003).
The upshot is that the Act fully exposes consumers to the rent seeking activities 
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of monopolists. At the very least, the Act ought to be amended such that the WSRB 
can apply specific criteria to make judgments on the level and reasonability of tariffs 
charged by WSBs (Mwangi and Gitau, 2003). Also, the WSRB has no independent 
source of funding. The Act only provides for the retention of revenues from license fees 
with the approval of the Minister and the Treasury. In effect, decisions of the Board 
that displease the Minister or the Treasury can result in denial of funding (Mwangi and 
Gitau, 2003). At the water utility level, there is no appropriate performance monitoring 
system in use, and appropriate standards and performance indicators have not been 
applied.
The 1986 Local Government Act (Cap 265) has been another important piece of 
legislation affecting water and sewerage services in the urban areas. Also, the 1999 
Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act deals with water resources protection 
and wastewater disposal. However, there is no specific legislation dealing with issues 
of environmental sanitation. The proposed environmental regulator created under the 
Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act has not yet been established and 
therefore has no history of operation. In addition, the Standards and Enforcement Review 
Committee (also created by virtue of the Environmental Management and Co-ordination 
Act) is given the responsibility for establishing water quality and effluent standards, but 
such standards do not yet exist. The absence of existing environmental standards is 
likely to introduce some uncertainty, particularly among private service operators, and 
this is likely to have several impacts. In all available options for privatization, except 
a management and service contract, private operators may have difficulty pricing the 
contract and, if applicable, estimating the required investments in the absence of some 
certainty about the new environmental standards that are about to be developed. 
Notwithstanding the absence of existing environmental standards, there is a Penal 
Code provision for general “pollution offences”. Private operators may have to be given 
some level of protection against the Penal Code in cases where pollution events are 
beyond their control.
According to Mwangi and Gitau (2003), privatization is not a solution for the 
governance problems Kenya is facing and may even exacerbate abuses of monopoly 
power. They proposed that wherever possible, meaningful competition should be 
guaranteed in cases of privatization, and the regulatory institutions be strengthened in 
order to enhance competition or prevent anti-competitive behaviour. Where competition 
is unfeasible (for instance in the provision of water services), regulators must possess 
the means to prevent monopoly power abuses, to guarantee improvements in public 
welfare. The Minister should make appropriate amendments for the protection of the 
public interest and allow for strengthened regulation, capacity building and consistent 
decisions in the public utility sector. However, these authors noted that the single most 
important issue hindering the creation of strong regulatory agencies in Kenya is the 
near absence of the relevant capacity and resources.
The implementation of the reforms is outlined in the sector strategy documents that 
were further developed in 2002-2003: The National Water Services Strategy (MWRMD, 
2003a) and National Water Resources Management Strategy (MWRMD, 2003b). A 
Water Sector Reform Secretariat (WSRS) was established in 2002 to coordinate the 
reform process, which is supervised by an inter-ministerial committee, the Water Sector 
Reforms Steering Committee (WSRSC). A Transition Plan for the implementation of the 
Water Act 2002 and a Route Map for the reform process were prepared by the WSRS 
and consultants. The plan outlines the implementation schedule of new institutional 
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arrangements (Figure No 2). The plan is dynamic, and some changes have already been 
realised.
Figure N° 2: New institutional arrangements proposed in the water sector reform process
    Source: Modified from MWRMD, 2003a; Government of Kenya, 2002.
Overall assessment and prospects for WSS in Kenya
A general assessment of the situation of WSS in the country has been part of the 
regional thematic activities of the World Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) 
for Africa (World Bank, 2003). Among other findings, the program highlighted that 
existing institutional arrangements in the sector are constrained by several factors. 
Sector policy development, operation, service delivery and sector regulation have not 
been adequately separated. CBOs who provide services to a third of the rural population 
lack an adequate legal basis. Local authorities play an important role in urban areas 
but there is a lack of incentives for improved performance and weak or non-existent 
monitoring. In several urban areas, efforts have been made to develop locally owned 
public utilities through donor-supported projects. However, the progress has been slow, 
with only two out of about ten LAs showing positive results. In some of the larger urban 
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areas PSP projects play an important role both in meeting the lack of services in informal 
settlements, and in helping businesses or the wealthy to cope with inadequate services. 
However, they often operate in the context of uncertainty and rent-seeking due to the 
lack of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework and tenure issues in the informal 
settlements.  
Centralized public-service providers dominate the sector in terms of expenditure, 
though local authorities also appear to play an important role in urban areas, and CBOs in 
rural areas. Recurrent expenditures by the service providers largely match their coverage 
levels. However, the share in development expenditure is significantly higher for CBOs. 
It is likely that the coverage by CBOs has increased through these investments, though 
this has proved difficult to assess due to the lack of detailed information on coverage 
through community-based schemes. Within the existing institutional arrangements, 
service providers use several channels and sources of funds (Appendix 1). While the 
Government budget is the dominant channel for WSS sector finance in Kenya, local 
authorities and off-budget channels are also important. The five main channels of 
finance are: i) the Government budget mainly used by the WSD of the MWRMD and 
NWCPC, ii) local authority budgets, relevant for those LAs that provide water services, 
iii) off-budget routes through NGOs mainly for CBOs, iv) internal generation by service 
providers, mainly by the NWCPC, local utilities, CBOs and PSP, other direct expenditures 
by communities and households. The total sector finance is estimated to be close to 
US$ 100 million or 0.7 percent of GDP. It appears that while allocation through the GOK 
budget is the largest contributor (29 percent), three other sources constitute about 20 
percent each: LA budgets, off-budget contributions by NGOs, and internal generation 
by WSPs. A significant portion of WSS sector resources is mobilized through user 
charges and donor support, though user charges are neither always protected nor used 
in a timely manner for operations. Similarly, most donor resources flow outside the 
framework of government decision-making (World Bank, 2003). In this regard, some 
key findings from the programme include:
• There is a preference for off-budget routes by donors/NGOs. A large proportion of 
total donor resources (nearly 70 percent) is provided through off-budget support, 
mainly through several NGOs, and is devoted to development expenditures for 
new community-based schemes.
• Internal generation is important but is not contributing to development 
expenditure. WSPs such as NWCPC, local public utilities and PSP projects depend 
on internal generation. However, their expenditure on development expenditure 
from this source is either non-existent or very limited.
• Incentives for enhanced internal generation are weak. While internal generation 
emerges as an important source, most WSPs lack incentives and capacity to 
maximize it.
• Local authority expenditures seem to be largely from user charges. However, 
these are not always protected, and an estimated 20 percent of revenues mobilized 
through water charges is probably used to finance other sectors/activities.
• User charges for other public sector WSPs are generally protected but there 
may be cash flow and efficiency problems. The user charges flow upwards to the 
general account (for MWRMD and NWCPC to the national level and for the LAs
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to the LA consolidated accounts) leading to two problems: i) cash-flow problems 
for operations, especially for regular maintenance, and ii) lack of incentives for the 
service provider to improve collection efficiency and service quality. 
The need for reforms has been in principle addressed by the 2002 Water Act 
(Government of Kenya, 2002), which includes proposals and legal provisions for further 
reforms of the country’s water sector. The proposed reforms include a separation of 
the key functions of policy formulation, water resources management, regulation, 
and service provision and production. One of the key features of the reform process 
is the separation of the responsibilities for water resource management and water 
service provision, as stated in the Water Act 2002. The Water Resources Management 
Authority (WRMA), and focal management bodies consisting of Catchment Area 
Advisory Committees (CAACs) and Water Users Associations (WUAs) will regulate 
water resources management issues. The water services sub-sector will be regulated 
through the Water Services Regulatory Board (WSRB). The proposed Water Services 
Boards (WSBs) will be responsible for water and sanitation services. Water and sewerage 
services production will be by Water Services Providers (WSPs), which will be designated 
by the WSBs.
The reform framework envisages a more streamlined sector finance with an emphasis 
on sustainable internal generation by service providers. The three main channels of 
finance in the emerging system would be: i) a Water Services Trust Fund (WSTF) for 
areas without adequate water services, ii) more streamlined GOK budget allocations, 
particularly through the new WSBs taking into account issues of equity, efficiency and 
coverage targets that may be set by the government, and iii) a greater reliance on internal 
generation by WSPs as a main basis for sector finance. In designing the WSTF, recent 
experiences with the WSS component in social investment funds and reforms needs to be 
taken into account, including aspects such as ensuring a demand-responsive approach, 
improved coordination with off-budget resources, exploring support for PSP projects, 
the role of local authorities in local planning and the use of output-based aid to ensure 
that community and private resources are not crowded out. While the WSTF is clearly 
positioned to receive and allocate grants, it is not clear how the WSBs will be financed 
through the GOK budget, and further how the WSBs will provide funds to the WSPs. A 
clearer understanding of whether this will be through debt or equity contributions, or 
simply as one-time grants needs to be developed. In developing this, the rather poor 
experience of the GOK loans in the past needs to be reviewed. Within this emerging 
scenario, there is a need to explore other potential sources of funds in the medium to 
long term including: i) market borrowing by WSBs and/or WSPs, ii) potential for micro-
finance, especially for the community based schemes, and iii) the possibility of PSP, 
which is more likely for efficiency improvements rather than for providing direct finance 
in the initial period. To promote such resource leveraging, an appropriate sequencing of 
activities is critical. As a first step, the need is to identify the potential borrowers within 
the sector and their creditworthiness and to assess the interest and potential of the 
domestic financial sector and the micro-finance industry. It is likely that the initial focus 
must be placed on enhancing the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. For example, 
recent inquiries regarding the possibility of private sector investments in Nairobi Water 
Services suggest that initial investments need to be made through the public sector. 
However, with efficiency improvements, in the future the utility would be able to service 
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debt and finance development expenditure through internal generation (World Bank, 
2003).
Considering the previous analysis, and in connection to the SWOT analysis presented 
in Table No 3, we suggest that the future development of WSS in Kenya requires several 
crucial steps:
1. Undertaking a sector-wide approach by linking access to WSS with health and
wealth creation as a means of demonstrating the contribution of water to good
health, livelihoods, and general wellbeing. Highlighting the benefits of reforms in
WSS provision from successful experiences should be undertaken.
2. Improving policy implementation for the effective commercialization process to
take off successfully. Advocacy approaches should be used to generate 
understanding and build support among policy makers across all government 
departments and related bodies for water sector reforms. A simply written policy 
briefing kit justifying the reforms and outlining their implementation process 
should be developed to support this effort. The kit should contain a simplified 
version of the Water Act and a description of the institutions established under the 
Act.
3. Implementing a comprehensive communication intervention with a wide reach
across all audience segments should be developed to increase knowledge and close
knowledge gaps among all sectors of the population on water sector reforms and to
correct misinformation and address misconception about the reforms. Communication 
programmes should explain the rationale and problems that necessitate water sector 
reforms and that it is a government initiative aimed at improving the management 
and provision of water and not a donor driven initiative (Apex Communications Ltd, 
2004b).
4. Establishing a strong network that would facilitate exchange of information and
ensure effective implementation of the Water Act. Thus, consultation with various
stakeholders is important to develop consensus and generate a sense of ownership
amongst the population regarding the water sector reforms.
5. Ensuring that the WSBs is made up of members of society who are strong-
minded and make no compromises to ensure an effective transition. Representatives
from NGOs and civil society bodies championing the rights of the poor should be
proactively engaged to increase their understanding and support of the reforms.
WSBs should have performance targets. Top management level staff should be
appointed based on professionalism and expertise for effective management of the
water companies. Consumer representation at the board level is important to instil a
sense of ownership amongst communities and consumers.
6. Helping organizations active in the water sector to include the water reform in
their agenda by developing an ongoing platform through which they can participate
in communication and mobilization activities (Apex Communications Ltd, 2004b).
7. Depoliticizing the water companies and give them the autonomy to run the
companies as independent entities. If the autonomy is only claimed on paper, it
will not be articulated on the ground. There is need to ring fence the established
companies from political interference in order to successfully provide sustainable
water services. Local authorities should understand that the water companies are
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their own agents and therefore any negative attitude or publicity towards the latter 
would only be detrimental to both parties. 
8. Commercialization of water is an expensive venture, as it requires capital
investment to enable supply to catch up and then keep pace with demand. To sustain
reliable supply, continuous system maintenance is inevitable to enable any WSP
to regain and maintain consumer confidence and achieve high revenue efficiency
targets.
9. Fully operationalizing the Water Act 2002 in order to enable the WSPs to operate
optimally.
10. Introducing and maintaining a realistic cost-recovery tariff that provides WSPs
with enough funds to operate and maintain the system in an optimum way. Working
towards a realistic level of unaccounted for water. With the old distribution system
in most water supply systems, achieving a figure of 25 percent in the short run is
unrealistic.
Table N° 3: SWOT analysis of the water services in Kenya and the reform process
Strengths (S) Weaknesses (W)
• Institutional change: The need for water sector
reform is strong due to the long period of
poor sector performance and inadequacy of
resources.
• New WRM strategy emphasises conservation
and equitable distribution and sustainable use
of water resources.
• New legal framework (Water Act 2002) intends
to clarify roles and separation of policy making,
WRM, and service provision and production.
• Reform process creates trust and attracts
external funding (strong external support from
donors).
• Success in some pilot projects (Nyeri, Eldoret)
encourages others to restructure and improve.
Reform facilitates improved service coverage
and quality (also in sanitation).
• New arrangements facilitate realistic tariffs,
appropriate internal cross-subsidies, and
efficiency in service provision.
• Reform process is asset-based, focuses
on specific areas and emphasises poverty
alleviation.
• Existing technical staff is trained, but the
reform aims at better technical and managerial
capacity.
• Reform process has started top-down from the
national level, and it is also fairly donor- and
consultant-driven.
• Proposed and already legally enforced
institutional arrangements do not fully
eliminate the multiple roles of MWRMD.
• Government intervention continues strong in
areas that do not attract autonomous WSPs.
Ownership of assets is still unclear.
• Sustainable financing mechanisms not
adequately addressed in new policies and
strategies.
• Present institutional arrangements are
working poorly (deconcentrated, centralised,
bureaucratic).
• The future role of local authorities has not
been adequately expressed in the reform plan.
• Time schedule for reform process is unrealistic 
in relation to local capacities and resources.
• Sanitation is not adequately addressed in the
reform process (inadequate integration).
• Low motivation among civil servants.
• Inadequate engineering expertise and know-
how.
• Inadequate customer orientation and
sensitivity.
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Opportunities (O) Threats / Limitations (T/L)
• New political culture (NARC) can provide better
political commitment to reforms.
• New water policy provides enabling
environment for reform continuation. Water
Act 2002 provides a solid basis for appropriate
institutional arrangements.
• Long-term sustainability and conservation of
water resources through holistic catchment
area thinking and demand management
strategies. Improved ethnic harmony as a result 
of reduced water conflicts.
• Reform provides opportunities for human
resource development (training and 
redeployment).
• New arrangements encourage applied research 
and innovative technologies.
• Good economic and business opportunities for
WSPs. Increased efficiency of operations and
service delivery.
• Increased involvement of various stakeholders.
• Independent regulatory arrangements
proposed, but regulation details and local
capacity need more elaboration.
• Kenya has a critical scarcity of water resources.
Resource allocation may pose conflicts.
• Improved service provision leads to increased
water use and thus increases pollution.
• Political interference in establishing WSB
boundaries. Politicians may have vested
interests.
• Strategies and plans may be too short-sighted.
• Cost of the reform process: allocation of
financial resources (and budgeting procedures)
may not in practice facilitate implementation of
reform.
• Inadequate human resource capacity,
especially at the lower levels (provincial, district, 
divisional).
• Assets may be undervalued causing poor cost
recovery.
• Local commitment to reforms may be low or at
least at risk. Resistance to change may arise
from several reasons, e.g. from fear of losing
jobs.
• New policies and strategies may be recognised
in principle, but old procedures (business-as-
usual) may persistently continue. Informal
institutions are difficult to change.
• Dissemination of the policy and other reform
components may not succeed as well as
hoped in the field. Lack or overlapping of
communication.
The privatization of WSS in Nyeri Town
Nyeri Municipal Council8 is comprised of ten civic wards with the Central Business 
District covering a small area, the rest of the area being basically rural and peri-urban. 
The Municipal Council is located in the Nyeri district of the Central Province, 
within the Mount Kenya region. The Nyeri district has seven divisions, namely: Nyeri 
Municipality, Tetu, Mukurweini, Othaya, Mathira, Kieni East and Kieni West (Table No 4). 
The population of Nyeri Town was estimated to be 120,000 people in 2001.
8 Note of the editor: after the study was finished, Nyeri Municipal Council was absorbed by the 
Nyeri County Council.
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Table N° 4: Area of Nyeri District
Division Area Locations Sub-locations
Nyeri Municipality 7 2 22
Tetu 384 6 37
Mukurweini 179 5 23
Othaya 170 4 28
Mathira 324 7 41
Kieni East 488 4 14
Kieni West 546 5 20
          Source: Nyeri District Development Plan 1994-1996.
The Nyeri District is situated between longitude 360 and 380 East and between the 
equator and latitude 00 38’ South. It is located 160 kilometres north of the capital City 
of Nairobi and covers an area of 208 km2. It is bordered by Laikipia District in the North, 
Kirinyaga District in the East, Murang’a District in the South, Nyandarua District in the 
West and Meru District in the North-East. It is an area of volcanic mountains including 
Mount Kenya and the Aberdare range, which strongly influence the climate and the 
agricultural potential of the district. The soils consist of red clays that are well drained 
and fertile. The pattern of rainfall is typically equatorial as the district is situated within 
the highland equatorial zone of Kenya. Rainfall varies from one place to another, ranging 
from 500mm in the Kieni plateau to 1500mm in the foothills of the Aberdare and Mount 
Kenya. There is monthly variability of rain. There are two rainfall seasons; that is, long 
rains that begin in March and end in early June, and the short rains that start in late 
September and continue to December.
The Nyeri Municipal Council took over the responsibilities for supplying water to the 
municipality in 1982. However, it was only gazetted as a water undertaker on 2 July 
1999. The sources of water supply are the Chania and Nairobi rivers, and there are two 
independent treatment plants located at Kamakwa and Kiganjo, which supply water to 
Nyeri and Kiganjo. In the 1980s and early 1990s there were acute water shortages, and 
the Municipal Council approached the German Development Bank KfW for assistance 
to extend the water system.
The privatization process
As explained before, Nyeri Town was selected as one of four pilot cases for the 
implementation of the commercialization/privatization of WSS projected under Phase 
IV of the UWASAM project (1997-1999), jointly implemented by the Ministry of Local 
Government and the GTZ. This led to the creation of the Nyeri Water and Sewerage 
Company (NYEWASCO), which was registered with the Register of Companies on 
23 September 1997 and commenced its operation on 1 July 1998. NYEWASCO is an 
autonomous and independent company charged with the task of supplying WSS to 
Nyeri Town’s estimated urban population of about 45,000 people. The company 
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signed an Agency Agreement contract with Nyeri Municipal Council to provide WSS 
for a period of 20 years. PriceWaterHouseCoopers, the management consultant, was 
commissioned to provide support to NYEWASCO in several areas, including determining 
its future strategy, organizational development, and developing a five-year corporate 
plan. The company established two main departments in order to reduce the red tape 
that previously existed in the municipal council.
NYEWASCO’s organizational and staff structures
The structure of NYEWASCO includes the Nyeri Municipal Council as the Shareholder, 
a Board of Directors, a Corporate Management Team (CMT), a Managing Director, a 
Technical Manager, and a Commercial Manager, in that order. This structure falls under 
option B of the World Bank categories of commercialization, where the facilities are 
publicly owned and privately operated (Figure No 3).
Figure N° 3: Organization structure of the Company
Source: Mukundi, 1999.
NYEWASCO adopted a leaner and flatter organization that facilitates fast 
communication and decision-making, thus enhancing efficiency. Grading and 
remuneration structures have been designed to support this structure, and to deliver the 
objectives of communication. Performance-related pay was put in place.  This is achieved 
in the form of performance-related salary progression and performance-related bonuses. 
The establishment currently stands at 134 members of staff covering managerial as well 
as junior staff cadres. All the staff, except for the Technical Manager and the Commercial 
Manager, were former employees of Nyeri Municipal Council’s WSD. The number and 
mix of staff hired was based on the activities that need to be performed. For positions 
where individuals are required to work in shifts (such as security guards), shift hours, rest
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periods and all other pertinent factors were considered in arriving at the optimal number 
of employees. The CMT oversaw reviewing the needs, and on this basis determined 
that the number of employees required was 118, thus reducing the previous staff 
body of 160. The reduction in the staff number was attributed to changes in 
technology (computerization and other technologies). However, it should be noted that 
despite the reduction, NYEWASCO was under obligation (at least in the short term) to 
take over all the 160 members of staff as per the Agency Agreement signed between 
the Company and Nyeri Municipal Council. The CMT, therefore, treated 118 as the 
target number of employees to be achieved over time. It is also important to mention 
that the number does not include security staff, who were to be 
outsourced. It was also accepted that the number of employees could 
occasionally vary such as during times of emergency repairs when it becomes 
necessary to engage casual labourers. These numbers are based on the 
business as it is today, and as is the case with the organizational structure, the 
number may also change as the organization grows. For instance, as the company 
continues to embrace commercial principles it is expected that efficiency will 
increase. This, coupled with the anticipated increase in the use of modern 
technology, may lead to a decrease in the need for administrative staff. 
However, as the water production and connections grow, more technical staff may be 
needed.
The grading structure prior to the reform was based on the Local Authorities’ code of 
practice, which stood at 20 grades from the bottom to the top. As part of the restructure, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers was required to develop a new grading and salary hierarchy/
structure for NYEWASCO. In order to achieve this objective, it was necessary to carry 
out a job evaluation exercise involving a formal and systematic comparison of jobs in 
order to determine the relative worth of different jobs. The primary aims of job 
evaluation were:
• providing a rational basis for the design and maintenance of an equitable and
defensible pay structure
• helping in the management of the relativities existing between jobs within the
organization
• enabling consistent decisions to be made on grading and rates of pay, and
• establishing the extent to which there is comparable worth between jobs so that
equal pay can be provided for work of equal value.
The consultant opted for a non-analytical job evaluation methodology due to 
time and financial constraints, and because the number of benchmark positions was 
small. The specific methodology chosen was the structured paired comparison. The 
technique required the comparison of each whole job separately with every other job. 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers and CMT jointly selected benchmark jobs to be evaluated, 
these jobs were then analysed and a job description for each job developed. Based 
on the results of the job evaluation, it was decided to create an 8-grade structure, 
including the CMT, as optimal given the number and variety of jobs in the organization 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 1999).
Except for the CMT, pay for all other staff was based on the Local Authorities’ 
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salary grades. The CMT pay was determined after their recruitment and was based on 
market rates and the salary expectations of the various candidates who applied for the 
positions. PriceWaterHouseCoopers were required to develop a remuneration structure 
based on the grading structure. Remuneration structures are the mechanisms that 
allow an organization to reward employees equitably, according to their contribution 
to the achievement of corporate goals. In this case, the consultant assumed that the 
remuneration structure should comprise some or all the following four elements:
• Base Rate – rewards for skills, knowledge and responsibility required from the
employee to perform a job. It is normally determined by job evaluation;
• Performance Element – rewards the individual for the way he or she carries out
his/her duties;
• Special Allowances – cover payment for those aspects that, if included in the
base rate or performance elements, would distort them. They relate to a general
condition that applies to a range of staff for all or part of the time, e.g. overtime,
shift allowance, responsibility allowances, etc; and
• Benefits in Kind – including all the employment costs not paid to the individual
in immediate cash, e.g. pension/provident funds, medical cover, insurance cover,
leave, etc. (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 1999).
NYEWASCO’s prior remuneration structure comprised 3 of the above elements; 
namely; base rate, special allowances and benefits in kind. The special allowances 
were leave and house allowance (or owner-occupier allowance), while retirement 
and medical benefits comprised the benefits in kind. In developing the structure, 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers stipulated the minimum (entry point earnings) and maximum 
(highest possible earnings for the grade) renumeration for each grade. For an individual 
to be paid at the entry level of his/her grade, he/she must have met all the minimum 
requirements for the grade, as set out in the respective job descriptions. If this is not 
the case, the individual’s pay will be below the grade minimum, until such a time 
that he/she has met the minimum requirements for the job. In determining the 
minimum and maximum levels for the various grades, PriceWaterHouseCoopers 
took several factors into account. Firstly, it considered the CMT’s pay, which is 
already determined, as a basis to ensure that there was a logical relationship 
between their pay and that of the other staff members. This was aimed at achieving 
internal equity while at the same time ensuring that the compression ratio (gap 
between the top and bottom) is reasonable. Best practice advocates a compression 
ratio of about 14 percent. While comparing the CMT’s pay to the rest of the staff, 
however, they considered the fact that the CMT members are on a 2-year-
employment contract, unlike the other staff who are currently employed on a 
permanent basis. The “temporary” nature of the CMT’s jobs dictates that the staff 
holding the jobs are paid a premium to compensate for risk/uncertainty associated 
with such short-term employment. Secondly, it addressed “internal equity”, which 
refers to fairness in remuneration within an organization. Internal equity is said to 
exist if jobs of similar relative worth receive similar compensations. Internal equity is 
one of the basic characteristics of an effective compensation system. In order to 
achieve internal equity, there must be some logical relationships within grades (i.e. 
grade ranges) and between grades (i.e. overlaps and premiums), as appropriate.
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Internal equity should, however, not be seen to imply that all jobs in a grade should 
draw equal pay. It simply means that whatever variations exist within and between 
grades should be perceived as fair by the staff concerned. Thirdly, it considered the 
utility’s “ability to pay”, on the principle that any remuneration-related 
recommendations or decisions must always address an organization’s ability to pay. 
In determining NYEWASCO’s remuneration structure therefore, the consultant 
considered the organization’s projected revenue and how much of it could be taken 
by the payroll, given the company’s other financial obligations. Fourthly, consideration 
was paid to the “commercial environment”. The CMT considered strongly that salary 
changes were needed to improve on the previously existing (very low) Local Authorities’ 
salary structure, in order to provide motivation to staff to perform in a more demanding 
commercial environment.
Several detailed discussions were held with the CMT to decide on the appropriate 
balance between the determining factors mentioned above and arrive to an agreed 
remuneration structure. The new structure is broad banded with no notches/steps. 
Traditional salary structures tended to include a series of steps/notches through which 
the individual progresses from bottom to top, by way of salary increments. Each notch 
usually represented a year at the grade. The number of notches was, therefore, an 
indication of how long an individual took to move within the grade. Salary 
increments under this structure tended to be uniform and automatic. Recently though, 
this approach to salary structuring has changed greatly. As organizations embrace 
performance-related pay, they are advocating an open grade range with a minimum, a 
midpoint and a maximum, but no notches. Salary increments are also no longer 
automatic and are pegged to performance. It was on this basis that the consultant 
did not recommend a notch (step based salary structure but a grade range 
(difference between minimum and maximum points in a grade) of 45 percent for 
grades 1-7, that is, those below the CMT. These ranges are considered adequate to 
allow the respective individuals to get increments that are motivational. It also 
considers NYEWASCO’s ability to pay. It was also decided to establish a 17.5 
percent grade overlap (the percentage difference between the maximum of each 
grade and the minimum of the next higher grade) for grades 1-7. Small overlaps 
discourage poor performers remaining in one grade and yet earning the same 
level of salary as better-performing new entrants on the next (higher grade. They 
also encourage staff to perform better and move to the next higher grade and earn 
more (subject to the availability of vacancies). Finally, it was decided to introduce a 5 
percent premium between grades 3 and 4, as this is a significant transition point where 
an individual is moving from tasks that require little or no skills to tasks demanding 
a higher-level qualification. It was, therefore, expected that the job would change 
substantially with the demands and responsibilities becoming greater.
NYEWASCO had existing job descriptions and person profiles based on the Local 
Authority definitions. These definitions are generic and apply countrywide. The 
primary setback is that such job descriptions do not consider the unique 
characteristics or situation of the Local Authority in question. In addition, the job 
descriptions did not incorporate commercial principles as embraced by NYEWASCO. 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers facilitated a workshop to train the CMT on how to prepare 
job descriptions and person profiles. The workshop was also aimed at agreeing on a 
suitable format for preparing the job descriptions. The primary objective was to ensure 
that the job descriptions prepared would serve multiple purposes such as clarifying roles, 
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assisting in recruitment, selection and placement, assisting in salary administration 
and identification of training and development requirements. The CMT was then 
charged with the responsibility for documenting the requirements of each position, 
including the qualities of the persons to fill the respective positions. The company 
was using the terms and conditions of employment as laid down by Local 
Authorities. Like the job descriptions, these terms and conditions are generic and 
apply to Local Authorities countrywide and thus, not incorporating unique 
circumstances obtaining in a location. Such broadly determined conditions do not 
give the management in question much leeway at the implementation stage. A 
conspicuous omission from the terms of service was performance management, a 
central component for the company. PriceWaterHouseCoopers developed initial 
terms and conditions of service and draft contracts of employment based on its 
knowledge of the company, its experience with other companies, and the 
requirements of the Kenyan labour law. Key among the issues stipulated in the 
employment contracts is that an individual’s progress in the company would be based 
on performance.
For this approach to work, however, NYEWASCO needed an operational performance 
management scheme, including a functional appraisal system. 
Performance management contracts already existed for the CMT, and these needed 
to be extended to other members of staff. Also, the CMT devised a plan to address the 
issue of excess staff in order to attain the target numbers in the shortest possible 
period. NYEWASCO opted for a relatively high initial ratio of payroll costs to revenue. 
Therefore, it was deemed important that overall payroll costs must be managed 
downwards by rationalizing staff numbers towards the stated target, and the revenue 
increases projected in the Strategic Plan are realized through high productivity gains 
from a smaller, more motivated staff. As mentioned before, the company had absorbed 
all the staff working at the WSD, 160 people against an expected figure of 118 
employees. Therefore, the company embarked on a policy of retrenchment through 
natural attrition, and while writing this report the staff force stands at 134. However, 
the lack of a trade union to handle the relations between staff and employer, and 
the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic9 have become the greatest challenges to 
human resource management in NYEWASCO.
NYEWASCO’s corporate vision and plan
The company drafted a five-year corporate plan in 1999 with the assistance of 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers. This corporate plan set out the company’s direction 
and detailed financial plans for the period. The company centred its strategic vision on 
the provision of high-quality water and sewerage services to residents of Nyeri 
municipality as efficiently as possible. To achieve this goal NYEWASCO intends 
to double the revenue by tapping the unfulfilled demand for its services. Among the 
company’s main goals and objectives worth highlighting are:
9 Note of the editor: Kenya has been one of the worst affected countries by the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
started in the 1980s. Estimates published around the time of our study showed that by late 2000, nearly 
2.2 million people were infected with HIV/AIDS, including 13.5 percent of the country’s adult population, 
while about 1.5 million people had died of AIDS since the 1980s (National AIDS Control Council – NACC, 
2001, cited in K’Oyugi and Muita, 2002, p. 2).
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Economic/financial 
• achieving financial self-sustainability regarding operations, maintenance and 
development within 5 years (by 2004)
• increasing revenue by a minimum of 100 percent within 5 years (by 2004)
• improving revenue collection by 90 percent within 5 years (by 2004)
• keeping overall annual cost increases below inflation; and
• reinvesting net operating profits for future expansion and stability of tariffs.
Positioning
• Doubling water production by 100 percent in 7 years (by 2006), i.e. from 7,500 to 
15,000 m3/day
• increasing the number of water and sewerage connections by 56 percent in 6 
years (by 2005)
• reducing the proportion of unaccounted for water from 50 percent to 25 percent
• adding 11 water kiosks to the existing 4 kiosks servicing low income areas
• reducing the proportion of water used by public institutions by about 40 to 20 
percent
• raising the number of sewerage connections from the present 6,400 to 10,000 in 
6 years (by 2005); and
• remaining the provider of both water and sewerage services.
Internal capabilities
• Changing the internal culture to reflect the values of efficiency, honesty, 
competence, motivation, friendliness and sense of ownership
• improving core business processes in order to increase the efficient provision 
of services to the consumer
• controlling resources efficiently; and
• bringing well co-ordinated management through management information 
systems, effective communication systems, performance management and 
consumer care.
NYEWASCO’s reported achievements
According to the records available from NYEWASCO’s self-assessment, the company 
made significant achievements in several areas (Table No 5).
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Table N° 5: Performance achievements
Achievement Description
Increased water supply From 6,000 to 9,000 m3 per day at Kamakwa water treat-ment works
Improved water quality No more complaints of high-water turbidity
Reducing the use of chemi-
cals in water treatment
Reduced Aluminnium use by 42 percent by changing 
from lumps to powder form
Power savings Recirculation of wash water resulted in power savings of more than 30 percent
Attendance to emergencies Pipe bursts can now be attended even at night
Improvements in the area of new connections and billing
December 1999 March 2003
Number of employees 160 134
Number of registered con-
nections 6,586 8,318
Number of metered connec-
tions 5,271 6,721
Number of operational me-
ters 4,729 5,661
Number of connections billed 
for sewerage 2,037 2,491
Upgrading and expansion of facilities
Nyeri water supply
• Chania Intake: pumping capacity has been increased from 1,600m3/day to 
5,000m3/day. The 1,600m3/day capacity pumps were replaced by two pumps 
with a 2500m3/day capacity each, and by a third standby pump of 5,000m3/day 
capacity.
• Kamakwa Water Treatment Works: three sedimentation tanks have been upgraded 
from 5,700m3/day capacity to 9,000 m3/day by installation of lamella plates. All 
wash water from sedimentation tanks and filters is recirculated back to the inlet 
works. This has reduced the power use at the high lift pumping station at Chania 
intake from 50,000 to 30,500 kwh.
• Kiganjo Water Supply: a new intake at Amboni River is on standby to be used 
during low flow in the Nairobi River.
• Kangemi Sewage Treatment Works: embankments have been built on three 
maturation ponds, which had been badly damaged.
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• Extension Services: water services have been extended to new areas and in some 
old areas, services have been improved or expanded. The areas include Gitathi-ini, 
Chania-rwamba, Misha and Thunguma
• Customers Care Services: public opinion consumer surveys were conducted in 
early 2002 to evaluate the effectiveness of the commercialization
• Social Responsibility: The Company has regularly been undertaking social 
responsibilities, including:
* contributing KSh 20,000 (US$ 263) to each of the ten civic wards every 
year for improvement of water-related infrastructure;
* subscribing a regular contribution to the Mayor’s Christmas tree;
* sending donations in the form of food and materials to Huruma Children’s 
Home; and
* supporting a handicapped girl at Joyton Primary School and contributing 
towards her education.
• There are five water kiosks serving low-income consumers in various areas. The 
Company is planning to provide more water kiosks. The water is sold at 3 KSh 
(US$ 0.04) per 20-liter jerrycans at the water kiosks, while the company charges 
the kiosk operators KSh 15 (US$ 0.2) per m3.
We come back to NYEWASCO’s self-assessment and related details later but let 
us review now the results of a field survey that we carried out to gauge consumer 
perceptions about the company’s performance.
Research findings
Before presenting our findings and reflections, it is important to place this case in 
perspective, as even in 2002 NYEWASCO covered only 25 percent of the total population 
of Nyeri Municipal Council for water supply, and 10 percent for sewerage. As showed 
later, these figures include an increase of 10 percent in the number of connections 
achieved by company since its start in 1998.
We carried out a field survey to gather the perceived changes among users of WSS 
in the situation of WSS before and after the privatization of the services. Other specific 
objectives included gathering consumer views on the general management of the WSS 
by the Company in relation to reliability, quantity, quality, cost of water and convenience 
in accessing the service. The study utilized quantitative research methods for household 
interviews, key informant interviews, and discussions with NYEWASCO’s CMT to 
collect data on service delivery, managerial/administrative aspects and operation and 
maintenance. A systematic simple random sampling procedure was adopted to select 
households/premises or institutions to participate in the interviews. A direct observation 
method was also used to confirm information gathered from the interviews, such as 
water leakages, existence of meters, and water use practices. In the field, the research 
team chose a convenient place to launch the sampling of households/institutions, 
working in partnership with two external researchers for peer support. Household heads 
or spouses were interviewed, and for institutions such as schools the principal/head 
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teacher or a senior equivalent was interviewed.
Within Nyeri Municipality, we chose Majengo Cluster (i.e. Majengo, Blue Valley, and 
Kangemi residential sites) purposely, because they represent the middle to low income 
population. The assumption was that this social classification could help to confirm or 
negate the prevailing argument that privatization of WSS hurt the poor and may lead to 
exclusion from water supply due to their inability to afford the cost of new supplies. The 
poor in Majengo Cluster comprise over 50 percent of the adult population, and they cope 
with poverty in various ways, including casual employment, doing without some basic 
items, purchasing of low-quality commodities, stealing, doing odd jobs, and depending 
on child work. Education status is low compared to other areas of the municipality, while 
the unemployment rate tends to be higher. This cluster was selected as an ideal study 
area for a variety of reasons. First, it had been identified by the Ministry of Planning in 
the National Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) study of 1996. Secondly, Majengo 
has similar characteristics to urban slums, and was selected for this study to provide 
data on urban poverty. Thirdly, the cluster is a low-income area with high housing 
density. The poverty assessment study showed that Majengo has the main features of 
urban poverty, according to indicators such as lack of necessities of life such as food, 
water, clothing, and shelter. The PPA gave the highest priority to indicators such as poor 
housing, insecurity, and lack of markets. In a second category of priorities, it considered 
other problems like unemployment, impact of school fees, problems of land grabbing, 
and the presence of street children. Other problems considered were water shortages, 
garbage disposal, the condition of roads, public street lighting, and sewerage.
Our survey applied a total of 100 questionnaires, in which 87 percent of the 
respondents represented household consumers, 10 percent businesses (i.e. one car 
wash, three hotels, four shops and one bar and restaurant), and 3 percent institutions 
(one school and two churches). At household level, the average household size was 4.3 
persons and the mean number of years in current residence was 13 years.
Consumer perceptions
The research found out that in the perception of the respondents, the current situation 
of WSS is satisfactory, compared with the previous period, as they credited the private 
company with efficient management. The study confirmed that the situation of WSS 
had been unsatisfactory before, in terms of quality, quantity, reliability and operation 
and maintenance of WSS. The management of the public operator had been inefficient 
in ensuring good quality water as related to turbidity. The water bills were often delayed 
and could take more than three months before being issued to consumers, while other 
consumers were not getting any bills, but still could be disconnected for non-payment. 
The billing system was in disarray since there were frequent cases of over-billing and 
breakdown of the billing systems. Leakage and other repairs used to take a long time. 
To get a rapid response and a quality service, people had to bribe the staff of the public 
company. Under the new conditions, billing is done every month and correctly, and a few 
cases of over-billing were rectified when reported. Leakages were promptly attended, 
the water supply is now more reliable, and the quality of water has improved.
However, respondents complained that water is now more expensive than it was 
before privatization. They felt that this was expected because previously the public 
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company was subsidizing the cost of the water. Also, the general feeling among the 
respondents was that they were not involved in the privatization process, as they only 
came to learn about it through letters issued from the Municipal Council. Nevertheless, 
85 percent of the respondents were aware that WSS are now managed by NYEWASCO, 
while 13 percent still think that the services are run by Nyeri Municipal Council (2 
percent did not know who manages the water supply). All respondents from institutions 
and commercial enterprises were aware that water and sanitation services had been 
privatized to NYEWASCO. Some consumers felt that there is a need for involving the 
public in ownership and management of WSS through share flotation by the company. 
This would enhance acceptance and reduce the feeling that the consumers are being 
exploited. 
Access to water and service quality
The survey examined four main types of access to water service available to the 
consumers: private connection, yard connection, water kiosk, and water vendors, 
assessing the situation before and after privatization (Table No 6).  However, it must be 
noted that the four kiosks covered in the study were owned and operated by individuals 
as private operations, not by NYEWASCO. These water kiosks were private businesses 
lacking a formal and regular business timetable, and water availability depended on 
the range of time the kiosk was open. Most of the water kiosks in the study area were 
open for between 6 and 15 hours (normally sometime between 6am to 9pm), keeping 
the same mode of operation than before the creation of NYEWASCO. Considering that 
33 percent of the households and two of the three commercial operations surveyed 
currently rely on water kiosks, the figures in the following discussion must be taken with 
caution, as 31 respondents, 31 percent of the total, are not served by NYEWASCO. 
Table N° 6: Type of access to water supply before and after privatization, by consumer category, 
in % and absolute numbers (N)
Consumer cate-
gory
Private 
connection
Yard tap Kiosk Vendors
Total
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Household
38%
(33)
39%
(34)
31%
(27)
25%
(22)
29%
(25)
33%
(29)
2%
(2)
2%
(2)
100
(87)
Commercial
50%
(5)
50%
(5)
40%
(4)
30%
(3)
10%
(1)
20%
(2)
- -
100
(10)
Institution
100%
(3)
100%
(3)
- - - - - -
100
(3)
Out of the total number of household users surveyed (87), before privatization 38 
percent had private connections, 31 percent used yard taps, 29 percent used water kiosks 
and 2 per cent relied on water vendors. The changes after privatization were small, with 
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a decrease in the use of yard taps, compensated with a higher number of users relying 
on water kiosks, which are privately owned by individuals and not by NYEWASCO. The 
small number of users in the other categories 
changes, and the table shows a similar situation for commercial users (10 respondents), 
and there were no changes in the situation of the three participating institutions. Even 
though Table No 6 shows no significant changes in the type of access to water supply, 
it must be noted that, according to its self-assessment, the company managed to 
increase coverage by 10 percent between 1998 and 2002 (Chart No 1).
Chart N° 1: Number of new consumer connections in 2002 
Source: NYEWASCO.
Regarding water quality, our survey only assessed consumer perceptions in relation 
to water colour, smell, and taste before and after the reform. The results, as Table No 
7 suggests, show that consumers perceive that there is a tendency towards improved 
water quality now than when it was under public management, although the 
figures are not conclusive. Out of the 100 respondents, 54 percent indicated that 
water quality was good when the company was fully public, a figure that increased 
to 66 percent under private management. Also, 23 percent responded that water 
quality was fair before privatization, a figure that increased to 30 percent after 
privatization. Finally, 23 percent indicated that water was of poor quality when it was 
under public management, while only 4 percent believed that it remained so after 
privatization. Some respondents complained that before privatization water used to 
be muddy during the wet season, and they doubted if it was treated at all.
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Table N° 7: Consumer perception of water quality, in % and absolute numbers (N)
Consumer category
Before privatization After privatization
Total
Poor Fair Good Poor Fair Good
Household
24%
(21)
21%
(18)
55%
(48)
31%
(27)
30%
(26)
67%
(58)
100
(87)
Commercial
20%
(2)
30%
(3)
50%
(5)
10%
(1)
30%
(3)
60%
(6)
100
(10)
Institutions -
67%
(2)
33%
(1)
-
33%
(1)
67%
(2)
100
(3)
Looking at the level of consumer categories, 48 percent of household consumers (87) 
to 67 percent under private management. The trend was the same with commercial 
consumers (10), where 50 percent of the respondents indicated that the quality of water 
of institutional consumers, the number is very low to have meaningful percentages, but 
2 of these users believe that the quality of water is higher under private management 
while only 1 thought that it was good before privatization. Overall, after privatization the 
percentage of consumers feeling that water quality is poor has declined.
respondents were requested to indicate whether they undertook domestic treatment of 
water to improve the quality. Despite that 66 percent of household respondents believe 
that the quality of water was good after privatization, 64 percent still boiled drinking 
water to ensure its safety, and institutional and commercial users were also divided 
about water safety. The high number of consumers practicing their own treatment of 
drinking water showed that even after privatization, many consumers have doubts 
about the quality of water supplied (Chart No 2).
Chart N° 2: Consumers practices on the treatment of drinking water after privatization
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In our survey we also examined the perception among users about the reliability 
of the water supply by assessing the daily number of hours that water was available 
in the various service levels (that is, private connections, yard taps and water kiosks). 
The results showed that most consumers with private connections had experienced an 
improvement in their water supply reliability: the number of users with 24-hour supply 
had increased from 66.7 percent before privatization to 95 percent at the time of the 
survey. In the case of users relying on yard taps, the figure increased from 79.2 percent 
before privatization to 88 percent. As noted earlier, the four kiosks covered in the study 
are owned and operated by individuals on a commercial basis, not by NYEWASCO, and 
their service was limited to between 6 and 15 hours daily. The 31 respondents using 
kiosks obtained water from four different water kiosks and indicated that water was 
available in a variable time range, which was like the situation before the creation of 
NYEWASCO. 
We also gauged users about their use of alternative water sources in case of failure 
of the normal supply. When there was an interruption of piped water supply, consumers 
depended on alternative water sources that ranged from neighbours in adjacent estates, 
water kiosks, vendors and the nearby Chania River (Table No 8).
Table N° 8: Alternative sources used in cases of failure, by type of main water supply, in % and 
absolute numbers (N)
One of the main findings reflected in Table No 8 is that the Chania River remains 
as the main alternative water source for a majority of the Majengo Cluster population 
covered in the survey. Muthuri (1995) found out that bacteriological analysis of the 
surface waters that included the Chania River that the Majengo Cluster depended on, 
were contaminated with bacteria of faecal origin. The untreated water of the Chania 
River, therefore, is unsatisfactory for drinking purposes. It was also noted that in case 
of system failure, those consumers using water kiosks moved to the next nearby water 
kiosk for water, hence they used kiosks as both primary and alternative water sources.
Type of main 
supply
Alternative sources used
Total N
Kiosk Vendors Neighbours River Stored water
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After
Private 
connection
4.9%
(2)
4.8%
(3)
12.2%
(5)
11.9%
(10 12.2%(5)
11.9%
(12)
56.1%
(23)
57.1%
(15)
14.6%
(6)
14.3%
(2) 41 42
Yard tap 8%(3)
8%
(2)
24%
(7)
24%
(6)
28%
(9)
28%
(7)
36%
(11)
36%
(9)
4%
(1)
4%
(1) 31 25
Kiosk 7.7%(2)
9.7%
(3) - -
15.4%
(4)
22.6%
(7)
76.9%
(20)
67.7%
(21) - - 42 31
Total 7 8 12 16 18 26 54 45 7 3 9898
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Water supply, billing, revenue, and UFW
Another aspect considered in the survey concerned perceived changes in operation 
and maintenance of WSS among those respondents served by NYEWASCO. 
These issues included the time taken by the company to respond to breakdown  
of water infrastructure, that is the time consumers stay without water due to 
operation and maintenance related issues. From the responses received, the 
perception is that before privatization to repair a pipe burst took days, weeks or 
even months, and that this has changed as under the new management it takes from 
hours to a maximum of one week to complete the repairs. This could be attributed to 
the fact that the company knows that its profit levels are related to the reduction of 
un-accounted for water in the system. It was reported that NYEWASCO officers check 
the main pipes regularly, and that consumers are informed in advance if there will 
be an interruption of the water supply to enable them storing water. The perceptions 
of the surveyed also suggest that there have been improvements in the efficiency 
of the billing system. We arrived at this conclusion because according to the 
survey, before privatization 53 percent of the consumers with private 
connections complained of problems in their water bills, while 41 percent of 
the grievances concerned over billing. The situation was similar for consumers 
using yard tap connections, whereby before privatization, 44 percent 
experienced cases of overcharging, compared to 27 percent after privatization. 
These comments must be seen in perspective, as Chart No 3 suggests that billing and 
revenue collection had been improving since 1995, and the introduction of commercial 
management in 1998 helped to speed up this process. It must be noted, however, that 
one of the factors that used to contribute to the dismal performance of the Municipal 
Council’s management of WSS was the issue of revenue collection, as opposed 
to water billed.
Chart N° 3: Trends in billing and revenue collection
Source: NYEWASCO, 2003a.
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The improvements could be attributed to the expansion of metered connections, 
unaccounted for water. In relation, to this, in many cities, especially in developing 
countries, over half of the water supply is unaccounted for. This refers to water that is 
the annual amounts of water produced and billed for the period 1990 to 2002 by the 
two main distribution networks, namely the Nyeri Water Supply that serves the main 
town area, and the Kiganjo Water Supply.
Chart N° 4: Nyeri water supply production against water billed
Source: NYEWASCO, 2003a.
As Chart No 4 shows, the amount of water produced has been increasing steadily 
but, contrary to expectations, the percentage of unaccounted for water (UFW) in Nyeri’s 
water supply network remains high, despite privatization. The amount of water produced 
Nyeri network.
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Chart N° 5: Kiganjo water supply production against water billed
         Source: NYEWASCO, 2003a.
According to NYEWASCO, some of the reasons that explain the persistence of high 
levels of UFW include the ageing infrastructure, most of which has already surpassed 
their design life resulting in massive subsurface leakages. Also, the Nyeri Supply 
network serves a high-density cosmopolitan area, as opposed to the Kiganjo network. 
The operation of the Nyeri network requires high operational pressures, which increase 
UFW. The large population served by the Nyeri network, measured by the number of 
consumer connections, increases the chances of water theft. According to the company, 
may have been colluding with consumers to cover up water theft for many years, and 
such habits die-hard. The new management has tried to implement strategies to reduce 
UFW that have resulted in the elimination of water rationing within the service areas, an 
increase in the number of active consumer connections, and the extension of supply to 
some areas neighbouring the original service area. Nevertheless, as showed in Chart 
No 6, NYEWASCO has reduced the percentage of UFW to 38 percent by December 
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Chart N° 6: Overall unaccounted for water during 2002
        Source: NYEWASCO, 2003a.
Water use
The main water uses in Nyeri Municipal Council are domestic (drinking and 
cooking), hygiene (bathing, washing dishes and clothes, and general cleaning), and 
amenity (washing cars). The consumers expressed willingness to use water for income-
generating activities, such as growing vegetables for sale, but they are restricted by its 
cost. The only income-generating activities based on water recorded in the survey were 
the sale of water to neighbours, and car washing services.
Regarding household water use, respondents with private water connections (34 
respondents) did not report changes in their daily water consumption after privatization. 
The average consumption reported before and after privatization of the water supply 
remained at 100 litres per day, with a minimum consumption of 20 litres per day and, 
a maximum of 333 litres. Households sharing a yard tap (27 respondents) reported an 
increase in water consumption per day from an average of 84 litres before privatization 
to 87 litres. These households reported no changes in the minimum and maximum 
consumption levels, which remained at 20 litres and 500 litres per day respectively. 
There was an increase in the level of water use reported by households getting water 
from kiosks (29 respondents), up from an average of 75 litres per day to 83 litres. There 
was no change reported for their daily minimum and maximum consumption levels, 
which were 20 and 200 litres respectively. Water vendors were not commonly used in 
Nyeri and out of the total 100 consumers interviewed only 2 were found getting water 
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from vendors. The average consumption for the two households was 30 litres per day 
per household.
Commercial enterprises with private connections reported an increase in daily 
water consumption from an average of 572 litres per day to 960 litres per day after 
privatization. The minimum daily consumption increased from 100 litres to 200 
litres in hotels and bars. The maximum level of water consumption was reported by 
car washing businesses, 2,000 litres per day, and it had remained unchanged after 
privatization. There was a decline reported in daily water use by commercial enterprises 
(shops) using yard taps as primary water source, down from 33 litres per day to 30 
litres. There was no change in average minimum consumption for these users, 
which was 20 litres per day, while maximum consumption decreased from 50 litres 
to 40 litres per day. A similar trend was reported by enterprises getting water from 
kiosks (a hotel and a shop), where average water use per day declined from 45 litres 
to 20 litres, the minimum daily consumption from 30 litres to 10 litres, and the 
maximum daily water use from 60 litres to 30 litres. The respondents indicated that 
the decline in water use was due to the high cost of water after privatization.
All institutions interviewed had private connections and water use per day had 
increased after privatization from an average of 186 litres to 252 litres. There was no 
change reported in minimum daily consumption levels, which was 70 litres per day 
(reported by a church), while maximum daily consumption was found in a school that 
had increased water use from 300 litres to 500 litres per day. The increase was due to 
the reliability of the system as there was no rationing and there was good maintenance 
of the facilities.
In the case of consumers getting water from shared yard taps, there was greater 
disparity. Consumers sharing the water bill consumed on average 58 litres per day, with 
a minimum consumption of 20 litres and a maximum consumption of 160 litres per 
day. However, for those users whose water bill was incorporated in the house rent, the 
average water consumption per day was 110 litres, with a minimum consumption of 20 
litres and a maximum consumption of 500 litres per day. This suggests that when the 
cost of water is hidden in a single bill that includes other items (the rent), users tend to 
have a higher water consumption or even wastage of water, as they may not identify 
the actual cost of the water they use.
In general, there has been a marked increase in water use per day by most categories 
of consumers, except for commercial units using water from yard taps and kiosks.
Per capita water use
We analysed per capita water use for household consumers by dividing the total daily 
water consumption by the total number of persons in the household. Just as there was 
an increase in average daily water consumption, also there was an increase in water 
consumption per capita per day. For households with private connections, the average 
per capita daily water use increased from 21 litres per day to 23 litres. This figure is 
much lower than the 40 litres per capita per day suggested by the World Bank, and the 
47.4 litres estimated by the authors of Drawers of Water II (Thompson et. al., 2001). It 
is however within the World Health Organization (WHO)’s minimum recommendation 
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of 20 litres per capita per day to ensure basic survival. Among households with yard 
tap connections, the average daily per capita water use of 29 litres did not change 
after privatization. The same trend was found in households using kiosks whereby 
water consumption changed slightly from an average of 22 litres to 23 litres per day per 
person.
Consumers were requested to indicate whether the water they got from their sources 
was enough to meet their domestic needs both during the time when water was under 
public management and after privatization. Table No 9 presents the results of our 
survey on this topic. 
Table N° 9: Consumers’ perception of the adequacy of water supply, in % and absolute numbers 
(N)
Type of main 
supply
Before privatization After privatization
Enough Not enough Total Enough Not enough Total
Private 
connection
97%
(40)
3%
(1)
100%
(41)
97%
(41)
3%
(1)
100%
(42)
Yard tap 96%(30)
4%
(1) 100%(31)
96%
(24)
4%
(1)
100%
(25)
Kiosk 85%(22)
15%
(4) 100%(26)
87%
(27)
13%
(4)
100%
(31)
Vendors - 100%(2)
100%
(2) -
100%
(2)
100%
(2)
Total 82 8 100 92 8 100
As showed by Table No 9, most consumers reported that the quantity of water was 
enough to meet all domestic uses. Among the consumers with private connections, 97 
percent reported that were satisfied with the quantity of water supplied both before 
and after privatization, while 3 percent reported that the supply was not enough and 
that they had to fetch extra water from the Chania River for washing only. The reason 
given for inadequate water supply in these cases was low pressure in the network 
causing intermittence in the water supply. A similar trend was reported by consumers 
using yard taps both before and after privatization, where 96 percent of these 
consumers felt that the water supplied was enough for their needs. Among 
respondents getting water from kiosks, there was a slight increase from 85 to 87 
percent reporting satisfaction with the quantity of water received after privatization. 
All households served by water vendors expressed that the quantity was not enough, 
and that they had to get additional water from kiosks or directly from the river.
WATERLAT-GOBACIT NETWORK  Working Papers
Research Projects Series – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 5 N° 2/ 2018
WATERLATGOBACIT
48
The cost of water
The design of water utility tariffs plays a central role in the implementation of the 
objectives of the organization. The price of WSS not only makes it possible to steer 
demand, both as regards the quantitative aspects of demand and the question of 
access to water to the services for the poorer sections of the population. It is worth 
noting that when the tariff is high, cases of water theft may increase, in addition to the 
increasing use of untreated, freely acquired alternative sources. When designing 
tariffs, special attention should be paid not only to the charge made for consumption, 
but also to the “condition of access” to water supplies and sanitation for poor 
groups of the population. NYEWASCO has different rates for household and 
commercial consumers, and the cost of water for these users depends on the 
amount of water consumed. The company has metered all piped, private 
connections. For yard taps connections, some households share the bill among 
households and in other cases the landlord incorporates the water charges in the 
rent. Nevertheless, the payment to the company is based on metered consumption. 
The kiosk operators were found charging KSh 3 (US$ 0.04) per 20-liter jerr cans, 
whereas NYEWASCO charges the kiosk operator KSh 15 (US$ 0.2) per cubic meter. 
The charges for water supplied by vendors ranged from KSh 3 (US$ 0.04) to KSh 5 
(0.07) per 20-liter jerr can.
Chart No 7 provides a synthesis of consumer perceptions on the cost of water, 
showing that most respondents said that water was cheaper under public management 
and that the cost of water after privati ation was too high. 
Chart N° 7: Respondents view on the cost of water after privatization by consumer category, 
in %
The chart shows that only in the case of household respondents with a private 
connection, a small number (2 percent) indicated that the cost of water is low 
under private management. Some respondents said that the cost is fair, but most 
consumers in all categories said that the cost was high or too high.
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Among consumers with private connections, before privatization 30.3 percent felt 
that the cost of water was high, a figure that raised to 78 percent after privatization. 42.4 
percent thought that the cost was fair before, but the figure dropped to 19.5 percent for 
the cost of water after privatization. 27.3 percent said that the cost of water was low 
under public management, but only 2.5 percent said that it was low after privatization. 
As for those consumers depending on yard tap connections, 55.6 percent thought that 
before privatization the cost of water was high, but the figure raised to 81.8 percent 
after privatization. 44.4 percent said that the cost was fair under public management, 
but only 18.2 percent thought it was fair under private management. Most respondents 
getting water from kiosks and vendors also indicated that the cost of water was higher 
after privatization. Table No 10 shows the results in more detail, by category of consumer 
and type of main supply. 
Table N° 10: Respondents’ perception of the cost of water after privatization by consumer 
category and type of main supply, in % and absolute numbers (N)
Type of 
main supply
Perception 
of cost
Consumer category
Households Commercial Institutions Total number
Private 
connection
Low 3%(1) - - 1
Fair 18%(6)
40%
(2) - 8
High 79%(27)
60%
(3)
100%
(3) 33
Yard taps
Low - - - -
Fair 22%(5) - - 5
High 78%(17)
100%
(3) - 20
Kiosks
Low - - - -
Fair 28%(8)
50%
(1) - 9
High 72%(21)
50%
(1) 22
Vendors
Low - - -
Fair - - -
High 100%(2) - - 2
Total number 87 10 3 100
The survey did not produce detailed information about non-payment of water bills, 
bu we gathered some general comments. Under both public and private management, 
the penalty for failure to pay water bills has been disconnection, if the user fails to 
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respond to company’s request for payment. For tenants sharing a yard tap water bill, 
failure to pay leads to banning the defaulters from using the yard tap, and in serious 
circumstances to their eviction.
Overall consumer perspective
Most respondents indicated satisfaction with the water supply service and credited 
several issues:
• the high cost of water since privatization, and particularly the very high cost
charged by kiosks because kiosk owners hiked the cost to cater for the increased
price of water
• low pressure in the networks in some areas making the supply unreliable
• poor drainage leading to contamination of water in the event of pipe breakage
• lack of consultation before privatization, and absence of opportunity for 
consumer  to participate in the process.
Chart No 8 summarizes the overall perception about respondents’ overall satisfaction 
with the current situation.
Chart N° 8: Consumer responses on the overall satisfaction with the services
Despite complaints on the high cost of water and other issues already mentioned, 
relying on water kiosks, and to a lesser extent those with private water connections.
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Additional details about NYEWASCO’s assessment
The management of the company was credited with changes in attitude and 
solutions together with consumers. To remain abreast with the situation on the ground, 
the management has developed a checklist of questionnaires that are administered to 
the consumers on a regular basis in which information is sought on aspects that may 
the company can serve them better, and this information is analysed and shared with 
the relevant management units for action.
and an increase in the capacity of the treatment works. However, as discussed earlier, 
the relationship between water sold and unaccounted for water has remained similar, 
as shown in Charts No 9 and 10.
Chart N° 9: Trends in water production, sales and unaccounted for water in 2002
       
Source: NYEWASCO, 2003a.
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Chart N° 10: Trends in total water billing and revenue collection10
        
Source: NYEWASCO, 2003a.
As showed in Chart No 10, since the establishment of the independent Water and 
Sewerage Department in 1995, tariffs have considerably been revised upwards to 
reflect the cost of providing services. Prior to this period, the tariffs were fixed 
arbitrarily without considering the cost of production and distribution of the services. 
Currently, the tariff covers operation and maintenance costs and part of the capital 
asset renewal costs (Mukundi, 1999). Taking the social dimension into 
consideration, NYEWASCO applies a progressive block-tariff aimed at cross-
subsidising the cost of WSS. A comparative analysis with the tariffs applied by 
other service providers showed that NYEWASCO is charging a higher tariff, 
except for Kisumu municipality. This has been justified as needed to achieve 
financial autonomy and conserve water resources.
A major bottleneck caused by problems with large water consumers such as 
government departments and institutions, which were not used to pay their 
water bills promptly and never got disconnected before, as it was felt that 
disconnecting these customers from the water supply could raise difficulties to the 
local authorities. NYEWASCO embarked on disconnecting the institutions due to 
non-payment, even though these users issued threats to the company. The 
institutions eventually paid and accepted that they must pay for water. Also,  
municipal councils were asked to refrain from influencing the decisions of the privatized 
utilities, as this would hamper the adoption of the commercial approach to WSS.
10 The range in “Amount” (Y axis) in the Chart goes from 0 to 120 million KSh. 120 million KSh is 
equivalent to about 1.6 million US dollars. The exchange rate considered was 76 Kenyan Schillings (KSh) 
per 1 US$.
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Regarding investment in infrastructure, since the start of operations in 1998 
NYEWASCO has made investments using internally generated funds (IGF) as shown 
in Chart No 11.
Chart N° 11: Internally generated investment funds11
           Source: NYEWASCO, 2003a.
development 
opportunities through in-house training and/or short courses lasting 
up to a year with the Kenya Water Institute (KEWI) with support from the Urban 
Water and Sanitation Management Project (MWRMD-GTZ, 2002). These activities 
include computing, technical skills from basic plumbing to meter reading and 
advanced water operations, and commercial aspecs including accounting, and 
store management. also involved issues of public policy, 
including consideration of the overriding national values and ethics and the 
national priorities underlining the “Licence to Operator” granted by the Government 
to WSS utilities. This involves issues of national legislation, regulation, and business 
behaviour. Training was also targeted at inducing members of 
commercially and service-oriented approach.
11 The range in “IGF investment” (Y axis) in the Chart goes from 0 to 25 million KSh. 25 million KSh is 
equivalent to about 329 million US dollars. The exchange rate considered was 76 Kenyan Schillings (KSh) 
per 1 US$.
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Summing up findings from Nyeri Town’s privatization
Kenya adopted the privatization of water and sewerage services to enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness. Although much has been achieved by NYEWASCO, 
there are several grey areas that still need attention as discussed hereafter.
Regarding the cost of services, privatization schemes throughout the world have a 
track record of skyrocketing prices, water quality problems, deteriorating service, and 
a loss of local control. Privatization advocates argue –usually without any supporting 
evidence– that switching from publicly owned and operated utilities to private sector 
firms will lead to greater economic efficiency, stabilized rates, reduced public debt, 
and improved budgetary management. A consumer survey conducted by Mukundi 
(1999) showed that 78 per cent of respondents with private connections indicated 
that the cost of water was high. This has also been reflected by a survey made by the 
company in 2002, which showed that over 58 percent of the 404 respondents were 
not satisfied with the water charges. The results of our own study have revealed that 78 
percent of the consumers in the Majengo Cluster having individual connections 
complained that the cost of water was high. These results tally with comparative 
analysis of NYEWASCO’s tariffs with those of other private water companies and 
municipal councils, which showed that NYEWASCO had a higher water tariff than 
the other companies. This means that the concern of those opposed 
to privatization is justified because the main aim of private water companies is to 
make profit and, hence, they increase tariffs to achieve this aim. This can hurt low-
income groups in the absence of government intervention to ensure that the 
poor can satisfy their water needs at an affordable price. It is also clear that water 
delivered by private vendors and kiosks is sold at a very high price, meaning 
that the under privileged are exploited because the operators charge KSh 3 
to 5 (US$ 0.04 to 0.07)  per 20-litre containers, whereas NYEWASCO charges 
vendors and kiosks KSh 15 (US$ 0.2) per m3 for the water that they sell to families 
and other users.
There is also a false perception that, when water services are privatized, 
the financial burden will shift from the public to the private sector, which would 
save taxpayer money as the private utility would take responsibility for the 
costs of repairing, upgrading and maintaining infrastructure. However, in fact 
consumers end up paying for these projects through their monthly bills. Tax-free 
public financing translates into lower-cost projects, while taxable private financing 
results in higher interest rates. As a result, the higher costs are passed to the 
consumers, who are forced to  pay more for the water they use. From the 
achievements made by NYEWASCO between 1998- and 2002, it is evident that 
the company has invested in infrastructure through internally generated funds. 
The company has also invested in social activities like donations to 
children’s homes and sponsoring disabled students, among other issues. This is 
unlikely to happen with international water companies.
In relation to billing and revenue collection activities, our analysis showed some 
improvement over the years, with greatest gains achieved since privatization in 1998. 
The bills are now delivered on time, and the consumer survey showed that 76.8 per cent 
of people interviewed acknowledged that the bills they receive are correct. The opinion 
pool survey also showed that between 70 and 92 percent of the respondents, depending 
on their category, believe that customer care had improved since privatization. Further, 
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the survey showed that 58 percent of the respondents believe that NYEWASCO is free 
of suspicions of corruption, although a large number seem to think otherwise.
There are several challenges ahead and aspects requiring attention. Issues like 
prompt attendance to pipe bursts, disconnection and reconnections, corruption, and 
provision of sewerage services are still yet to be improved. Also, there is much to do to 
increase the quality of service. Some problems identified by the company as obstacles 
for improvement are the fact that they had to keep 100 percent of the staff “inherited” 
from the public utility, which makes it difficult to inculcate the new values required to 
perform in a commercialized company. For example, some employees found hard to 
adapt to new duties, such as undertaking emergency operations on a 24-hour basis. 
Also, the increase in production of treated water has not translated into increased sales 
due to leakages and water theft.
The privatization of WSS in Tala Town
Tala Town is under the jurisdiction of Kangundo Town Council, which is one of the 
five Local Authorities of the Machakos district, Eastern Province. It is located at 67 
kilometres from Nairobi City. According to the 1999 census, it has a population of 22,375 
people. The administrative boundary encloses an area of 33.7 km2. The area receives 
an average annual rainfall of 900mm, and the main economic activity is subsistence 
farming, though there are also coffee factories and public and private service and 
commercial employers. The town has a range of public and private services, including 
electricity, telephone services (both private and public), private and public transport, 
a market, private and public schools, a commercial bank, and several government 
departments. The average household size is 4.52 persons with an average of 1.59 
members in full employment. Estimates have suggested that on average households 
are expending substantially more than their reported income: the combined average 
household expenditure is estimated at KSh 9,651 (US$ 127) whereas the reported 
average income is only about KSh 8,614 (US$ 113) . Water and sanitation services are 
estimated to take about 5-9 percent of total household expenditure (BG Associates, 
2002).
Tala Town gets its water from a borehole with a tested yield of 105 m3 per hour, 
which was drilled around 1946. The borehole is about 1.5 km from the town centre 
and serves a supply area of 4 km2. It is equipped with an electrical submersible pump 
whose pumping rate is estimated at 45 m3 per hour and which has a tripod gantry 
protruding above an open roof. The 152 mm diameter plain steel-finishing casing is 
below the concrete floor slab of the borehole house on the ground level. The borehole 
is not capped to protect foreign objects from falling into it. Water is released from the 
storage reservoir into the distribution system by gravity and the flows are very low. 
The types of service supply include private piped connections, shared yard taps, and 
four water kiosks serving those without connections. Two of the kiosks are built of 
iron-sheets with a single draw point, whereas the other two have a stand post with 
a short length hosepipe for filling water jerrycans. All the water kiosks are metered. 
Water is pumped 24-hour round without a standby pump. The average daily production 
is 100 m3 against an estimated water demand of 750 m3 per day. The town does not 
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have a public sewerage system, and residents depend on pit latrines (92%) and septic 
tanks (BG Associates, 2001).
The privatization process
Until July 1999, the management of the water supply services was in the hands of 
the Kangundo Town Council. The system experienced many operational problems 
and hence its performance was dismal. Some of these problems included poor 
operational and maintenance practices, difficulties to purchase materials for 
operation and maintenance repairs, lack of resources to settle electricity bills, a high 
level of illegal connections, inadequate water supply to meet the growing demand, 
and weak revenue collection. In general, due to the council’s inability to fund the 
maintenance of the system, it had fallen into disrepair with blocked and broken pipes 
as well as a poor reticulation system. The council workers had low moral due to the 
lack of a regular salary, and therefore they were not responding to consumers’ 
grievances on time. Simple repairs could go unattended for days. All these problems 
resulted in acute shortage of water, and people supplemented their water needs from 
other sources such as wells, a dam, and private boreholes or relied on water vendors. 
As a result of the poor management, in 1996 operations stalled for three years without 
any water supply in the township.
According to the records, in 2001 the Town Clerk of Kangundo Municipal Council 
reported that the provision of water supply services in Tala Town was a liability to the 
Municipal Council, owing to its many financial difficulties. In 1998, Tala Town 
owed Kenya Power and Lighting Company a total of KSh 900,000 (about US$ 11,800). As 
a result of these problems, it was decided to privatise Tala Water Supply by entering into a 
30-year lease contract with the private company Romane Agencies Ltd. to run the water 
supply system starting in 1999. Romane Agencies Ltd. was given a 3-year grace period 
to service the inherited debts from the public utility, which was eventually paid in 
the year 2000. According to the contract, after the fourth year, the company was to 
start paying 10 percent of the total revenue collected to the Kangundo Municipal 
Council, with a proviso that the percentage could be reviewed upwards with time. The 
contract is renewable, and the company is responsible for repair and maintenance of 
the water facilities and runs the system at its own risks. Its remuneration is based on user 
charges and fees from new connections.
The population of Tala Town when the contract was signed was over 
22,000 people and is projected to be 120,000 by 2020. The daily water supply by is 
100 m3 against a demand of about 750 m3. By 2020 and with a projected population 
of 120,000, the daily water demand would be over 3,000 m3. Therefore, the supply will 
need to be increased 30 times to meet the projected demand. To make sure that 
tariff increases would be affordable, the Tala Water Supply lease contract 
includes an innovative cost-sharing arrangement between the Town Council and 
Romane Agencies Ltd., whereby the tariff will be adjusted gradually until reaching 
a point of full-cost recovery expected to be around the tenth year of the lease.
Romane Agencies Ltd. contracted Davis and Shirtliff, an international 
consulting firm, to do a survey of how to improve the short-term delivery of water, and to 
develop a long-term plan for the improvement of services. The goal is to make an impact 
as a provider of private WSS to prove that the privatization of these services is the
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solution to the poor-quality WSS characterizing local authorities in Kenya. The 
general objectives of the company are:
• supplying (through rehabilitation and development) clean water in the Kangundo
Urban Council, in the Eastern Province, and eventually expanding to other parts
of the country within the next 5-10 years
• achieving technical competence in the provision of quality water supply within
the next 5 years
• improving sanitation services over the 30-year life of the project, with emphasis
on environmentally acceptable options, and extending coverage to other needy
areas.
To ensure the efficient supply of safe water to meet the demands of all users, Romane 
Agencies has also laid down specific objectives and plans:
a. supplying with enough clean water half of the potential number of 
consumers who do not have access to water supply, sanitation, and 
hygienic practices for handling water, by the year 2015, and to provide 100 
percent coverage for water supply by the year 2025
b. metering water use by large consumers, and billing low-use consumers   
with a fixed monthly rate. The estimated cost to install water meters for the 
100 large water users identified is KSh 400,000 (about US$ 5,300) 
c. expanding water supply coverage up to a 15-kilometre radius of Tala Town
d. educating consumers to appreciate the worth of paying for improved 
water services
e. drilling new boreholes. So far geological surveys carried out by government 
geologists from the Machakos District Water office have identified ten target 
sites. Three of these sites showed potential for yielding enough water for the 
projected needs. The required government permits have been paid for 
and work started in September 2002 for the first borehole. The second and 
third sites were to be commissioned before the end of March 2003 
f. exploiting other available water sources such as protected springs and 
agreeing with community groups to manage these sources. The plan is 
that Romane Agencies Ltd. will buy their water to increase availability for 
the Tala Water Supply, and the communities in return will use the funds to 
manage the project. The company has also approached individuals with 
private boreholes and offered to buy water from them for distribution in Tala 
Town.
Self-assessment by Romane Agencies Ltd.
The company records show that by the year 2000 they had paid the outstanding 
debts inherited from the public utility. Also, the company completed the rehabilitation 
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of the water supply system that had stalled in 1996 and constructed a new water tank 
with a capacity of 50 m3 to improve water pressure. Moreover, Romane Agencies Ltd. 
improved the reticulation by unblocking old pipes and replacing old uPVC pipes 
with galvanized iron (GI) pipes. The company also bought two water pumps for 
installation at the existing borehole, and a new electric panel for the pumping station. 
The company set up a management office, bought computers, and assembled a 
management team. There is also a customer service unit to ensure customer care. 
One of the first tasks completed was to identify and disconnect all the illegal 
connections. Also, the company opened four water kiosks to serve unconnected 
consumers, who are scattered around the supply area. They also identified high water 
consumers like schools and hotels and installed water meters in these cases. The mode 
of charging for water has not changed after privatization, as the private company is 
using the same billing system used before by the Municipal Council. This consists in 
a flat rate (fixed amount) for unmetered piped connections, a proportional rate 
for metered connections, and the charges per 20-litre jerrycans by water kiosks. 
The latter is also used by private vendors. There has been improvement in the 
billing system, which has been computerized. Records are updated daily and 
there is a comprehensive list of all consumers, while bills are now released 
promptly. The meters are read once every month and water bills for metered 
and non-metered connections and consumers are given 15 days to pay their 
bills. As before privatization, the penalty for failing to pay water bills is 
disconnection, in the case of private piped connections. For tenants sharing the bill of 
a yard-tap connection, failure to pay results in the household being barred from 
using the yard tap, and in serious circumstances, they are evicted.
Research findings
Romane Agencies Ltd. has interests in several business activities, including a 
petrol station, a medical clinic, and a school. This study did not explore in detail how 
these businesses were linked and focused on the management and 
performance of water services. The company was not required to hire employees 
from the water department at privatization and has five members of staff plus the 
kiosk operators. An Executive Director controls and directs the general operations, 
while management and administrative functions are handled by an accountant who 
operates from the school. Daily operations are the responsibility of three 
members of staff, a cashier, a plumber/line patroller, and an administrator, who 
are based in the town. In addition, there are four kiosk operators, of which two 
are women. It appeared that the daily running of the water supply had not been 
entrusted to professionals with training in water supply, and some employees have 
dual roles in the different businesses run by the company. The privatised Tala Water 
Supply is run like a retail business outlet selling water at the kiosks and 
collecting payments from connected customers. It is significant, as a report by BG 
Associates indicated, that after privatization the cost of water services in Tala Town 
takes about 5-9 percent of total household expenses (BG Associates (2002). 
About 80 percent of Tala Town residents buy water from other sources, mainly from 
springs and storm water collection dams. Out of the 401 consumers (water connections) 
inherited, only about 110 are active, and the rest (72.6 percent) have been disconnected 
owing to non-payment. Only 12 connections are metered, while the rest are charged on a
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flat rate. The responsibility for providing water meters was not addressed in the 
contract, and there has been no decision yet over whether the company or the 
consumers themselves should be responsible for the meters. Due to the high number 
of unmetered connections, water losses resulting from uncontrolled usage and illegal 
consumption are high, although it cannot be accurately quantified since there is no 
data available on water production and consumption. Also, there is no record of 
operation and maintenance activities, which could be attributed to the fact that 
the staff hired by the company are incompetent and unskilled in terms of water 
management, and that they are also tasked with other responsibilities by the 
company (BG Associates, 2001).
We also found that before the Municipal Council stopped operations around 1996, 
the central part of the town’s market that comprises most of the business premises 
were served by the piped network. After privatization, this area, despite being the more 
likely to pay for water consumed, has not been connected. While Romane Agencies 
Ltd. argues that this problem is due to lack of pressure in the network, this is hardly 
convincing. Even though a new borehole was drilled near the market centre, many of 
the interviewed believe that the borehole is for some private activity and is unrelated to 
much needed improvements in the water service. In fact, the company has concentrated 
on supplying consumers located near the borehole that is the source of supply, which 
caused much frustration. During discussions with the residents, it emerged that the 
company had concentrated its operations in a small area, where the cost of supply was 
perceived to be more profitable, and that the company does not seem to be interested 
in increasing coverage or recruiting new consumers. This is supported by the fact that 
the number of connections has remained largely unchanged after privatization. This 
problem is perceived to go against the principle of equitable access to water. As the 
company has not discussed these matters with the community, people feel that it is 
not interested in improving the service.
Customer perceptions
We carried out a survey in February 2003 to asses consumers’ perception about 
water supply services in Tala Town before and after privatization. We focused on three 
types of consumers: individual households, commercial enterprises (two shops, two 
hotels, four bars, one car wash and a slaughter house), and institutions (a nursery 
school and a church). There was a total of 41 respondents, of whom 29 (71 percent) were 
household consumers, with an average household size of 5.7 persons. There were 10 
commercial enterprises (29.3 percent), and 2 institutions (4.9 percent).
General aspects
The respondents confirmed the difficult situation of water supply services and 
indicated that the Kangundo Municipal Council had mismanaged the system. There 
was a problem as the demand for water had outstripped the supply, and poor revenue 
collection was a major factor that led to poor service delivery and eventually to the 
collapse of the system in 1996. Since the start of the contract with Romane Agencies 
Ltd. in 1999, respondents reported slight improvements. For instance, operation and 
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maintenance problems such as leakages and breakdowns are quickly repaired, and the 
workers respond promptly to complaints. Water bills are issued on time and consumers 
enjoy a good relationship with the company employees. The company is drilling another 
borehole to increase its supply and manages water kiosks in the township where water 
is sold at KSh 3 (US$ 0.04) per 20-litre jerrycans. Those customers with private and yard 
tap connections are charged a flat rate of KSh 465 (US$ 6.2) per month. This tariff is 
slightly higher than the rates applied by the public company before privatization, where 
water kiosks were charging KSh 1 (US$ 0.013) per 20-litre jerrycans, and a monthly flat 
rate of KSh 400 (US$ 5.3) for piped connections.
The privatization process
Respondents complained that the tendering procedure to privatize the water supply 
system was biased, and all respondents but one stated that they were not consulted 
before privatization. Some consumers suspected that there was a foul play between 
the Municipal Council and the owner of the private company, since the company has 
already acquired all water assets from the council while supposedly the contract had 
been a lease agreement. Others expressed fears that the council had been tricked 
into signing the contract and would eventually lose all the water infrastructure to the 
private company. Some stated that the move to privatize was a short-sighted decision 
to salvage the financial situation of the council. In summary, respondents expressed 
dissatisfaction with the way the privatization process was carried out, and the general 
feeling was that they should have been consulted. There was a strong perception that 
corrupt arrangements may have been the sole motive of privatization, and not the 
improvement of the water supply service. In responding to the question of who currently 
manages the water supply services, 95 percent of the respondents knew that the water 
supply system is currently privatized, and only 5 percent think that it is still run by 
Kangundo Municipal Council. This 5 percent unaware of the privatization process was 
found in household consumers, as all commercial enterprises and institutions were 
aware of the change. 
Type of main water supply
The survey assessed the situation before and after privatization looking at four 
commonly used types of water supply: private connections, yard tap connections, 
water kiosks, and water vendors, though some respondents were also found getting 
water from their neighbours and from community water points. Table No 11 shows the 
distribution of respondents by type of main supply before and after privatization.
WATERLAT-GOBACIT NETWORK  Working Papers
Research Projects Series – PRINWASS Project – Vol. 5 N° 2/ 2018
WATERLATGOBACIT
61
Table N° 11: Respondents’ by type of main supply, in % and absolute numbers (N)
Type of main supply
Respondents
Before privatization After privatization
Private connection
35.9%
(14)
36.6%
(15)
Yard tap
46.2%
(18)
34.2%
(14)
Water kiosks
7.7%
(3)
26.8%
(11)
Water vendors
5.1
(2)
(2.4)
(1)
Neighbours
2.6%
(1)
-
Community water points
2.6%
(1)
-
Total
100%
(39)
100%
(41)
The following must be read with caution, as the number of respondents was 
relatively small for some categories of users. Nevertheless, it was established from 
the responses that consumers used different types of access to water 
sources before and after privatization. Table No 12 shows that, according to the 
respondents, before privatization household consumers used all the available types 
of access. All commercial enterprises and institutions had a private piped supply 
connection. After privatization, the percentage of household consumers with a 
private piped connection raised from 21 to 28 percent, while those using shared yard 
taps dropped from 57 to 45 percent. The number of households using water 
kiosks jumped from 11 to 24 percent after privatization, while 3 percent 
continued to get water through handcart vendors. Those who before relied on 
neighbours or water from a dam, after privatization moved to other forms of 
supply, most likely water kiosks. Among the commercial enterprises, there was 
slight decrease in private piped connections from 67 to 60 percent, and there was 
also a drop from 22 to 10 percent in the use of yard taps, as there is a jump from 
0 to 30 percent in the use of water kiosks. There was a similar change in the 
case of the two institutions included in the sample, as both had private 
connections before privatization, and after one of them resorted to get water from a 
kiosk.
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Table N° 12: Type of access to water supply before and after privatization, by consumer category, 
in % and absolute numbers (N)
Water quality
Previous studies on households’ responses to the deficient water supply run by the 
public utility in Tala Town and neighbouring areas had revealed that nearly all households 
depended on multiple sources of water, including house taps, wells, boreholes, public 
kiosks, streams, dams, and street vendors. Poorer households bore a disproportionate 
share of the burden of water deficiency and spent a larger portion of their income to 
supplement inadequate water supply than did the wealthier households. This included 
time spent looking for water and money spent on trying to dig water holes. Other costs 
included money for treating water-borne diseases due to the consumption of unsafe 
water from streams and dams. Women bore the largest burden in water provision. 
Privatization was deemed to provide a solution to these and other problems.
To assess consumers’ perceptions on the quality of water supply, the respondents 
were requested to indicate how they felt about the quality of water from primary water 
sources before and after privatization, and whether they stored water. Consumers 
acknowledged that the company makes efforts to treat the water but noted that at 
times it had small suspended particles. The analysis showed that there was a 
positive trend in the perception of users, as those believing that water quality was 
poor dropped from 33.3 to 14.6 after privatization, while the numbers that thought 
that water quality was fair increased from 48.7 to 65.9 percent, and those who stated 
that water was good also increased from 17.9 to 19.5 percent, suggesting that there 
has been improvement in water quality after privatization. Looking at the 
responses by type of consumer, we found that among households with private 
connections the number that thought that water quality was poor dropped from 39 to 
17 percent, while those stating that water was fair or good increased from 38 and 23 
percent to 59 and 24 percent respectively. Among commercial consumers, the number 
that felt that water quality was poor dropped from 22 to 10 percent, those suggesting 
that it was fair increased from 67 to 80 percent, and the numbers that believe that water 
was good dropped slightly from 11 to 10 percent. The two institutions indicated that 
water quality was fair before and remained the same. However, these figures must be 
Consumer 
category
Private 
connection Yard tap Kiosk Vendors Neighbour Dam Total
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After
Household
21%
(5)
28%
(8)
57%
(16)
45%
(13)
11%
(3)
24%
(7) 3%(1)
3%
(1)
3%
(1) -
4%
(1) -
100
(27)
100
(29)
Commercial
67%
(7)
60%
(6)
22%
(2)
10%
(1) -
30%
(3)
11%
(1) - - - - -
100
(10)
100
(10)
Institution
100%
(2)
50% 
(1) - - -
50%
(1) - - - - - -
100
(2)
100
(2)
Total 14 (1) 18 14 3 11 2 1 1 0 1 0 39 41
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considered against the fact that 55 percent of household and 50 percent of commercial 
and institutional respondents think that water is unsafe to drink and therefore practice 
domestic treatment, consisting in boiling the water used for drinking (Chart No 12).
Chart N° 12: Percentage of respondents boiling water after privatization
Reliability of the water supply service
From the responses received, it emerges that the privatization of Tala Water Supply 
did not introduce significant change in the reliability of the service. The same system 
of rationing applied before privatization is still being practiced, and the water supply is 
provided for a daily average of around 14 hours, whereas the average weekly reliability 
was 4.7 days. This situation is worsened by interruptions of the power supply or major 
breakdowns (BG Associates, 2001). Confirming the serious unreliability of the service, 
all respondents indicated that they had stored water before and continue to do so after 
privatization. The main reason for storing water was to ensure that there was always 
water even during rationing or when there was power failure, pipe bursts or breakdown 
of the pumping equipment.
Respondents tend to believe that after privatization there is more efficiency in 
responding to consumer demand, especially in case of pipe bursts, although there 
was disagreement in the estimation of how long it used to take before breakdowns 
were rectified. In this regard, among consumers with private connections the figure 
that believe that it took up to one day to repair pipe bursts raised from 7.7 to 53 percent 
after privatization. The number that thought that repairs usually took between two and 
four days dropped from 38.5 to 33.3 percent, and those believ  that repairs 
could take up to one week dropped slightly from 15 to 13.3 percent. Also, 30.8 percent 
indicated that before privatization repairs could take several weeks even months, 
and 7.7 percent did not know how long it took.  consumers using yard taps, 
the number believ  that it took up to one day to repair bursts increased from 7.7 
to 42.9 percent, those who indicated that it could take between two and four days 
raised from 7.7 to 28.6 percent, while the figure of yard-tap users estimating that it 
took up to one week to repair bursts dropped from 38.5 to 21.4 percent. The 
figure of those who believe that repairs could take several weeks also dropped, from 
30.7 to 7.1 percent, and 15.4 percent did not respond. Concerning users of water 
kiosks, 67 percent indicated that it took the municipal company several weeks to 
repair pipe bursts, while 33 percent of the respondents did not know.
With or without piped water supply, water must be available for life to continue, 
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and therefore when there are interruptions consumers look for alternative sources. 
Regarding household respondents with private connections, 25 percent indicated that 
they got supplement water from vendors, 38 percent borrowed water from neighbours 
(who had private boreholes), while a further 37 percent relied on storage tanks. Among 
commercial users with private connections, 33 percent bought water from vendors 
during interruptions of the supply, 50 percent got water from individuals with private 
boreholes, and 17 percent from community water points (a communal borehole and a 
dam), while the two institutions relied on neighbours’ boreholes as alternative sources. 
In the case of household consumers using yard taps, 8 percent bought water from 
vendors, 62 percent got water from neighbours with private boreholes, and 30 percent 
had stored water. Commercial enterprises got water from neighbours when there was 
no water in the yard taps. Among household consumers using water kiosks, in times 
of service interruption 14 percent got water from vendors, 72 percent from neighbours, 
and 14 percent from a dam. For commercial users relying on water kiosks, 67 percent 
solved the problem buying from water vendors and 33 percent from neighbours. 
Institutional consumers used vendors as an alternative source when there was no 
water in the kiosks. It was reported that there were households with private boreholes 
who supplied water to their neighbours either free of charge or for a fee when the water 
supply was not functioning. According t a report from BG Associates (2001), about 50 
percent of the households were not relying on the piped system as their primary source 
of water. Due to frequent water shortages, it was reported that water vendors have 
taken advantage and sell water for as much as KSh 20 (US$ 0.26) for a 20-litre jerrycan 
during the dry season. The sources from which these vendors fetch water are dubious 
and often the water is dirty and contaminated. As a result, cases of diarrhoea, typhoid, 
and bilharzias are on the increase.
Water use
Water use in Tala Town is restricted to domestic uses such as drinking and cooking, 
hygiene (bathing, washing dishes and clothes, and general cleaning), amenity (washing 
cars, and gardening) and production (consumption by livestock). This study did not 
explore the amount of water used for each of these uses; however, an attempt was 
made to estimate the amount of water used generally by consumers when using 
different sources. Daily consumption by institutions was not affected by privatization 
as consumption in the school remained at 40 litres per day, while in the church it 
remained at 60 litres per day. However, there was a general increase of water usage by 
households with private connections, rising from a daily average of 110 litres to 131 litres 
per household after privatization. The minimum consumption rose from 60 litres to 
80 litres, and the maximum from 200 litres to 250 litres after privatization. There was 
also an increase in the mean daily water consumption among household consumers 
relying on yard taps, but there was a decline among consumers getting water from the 
kiosks (Table No 13).
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Table N° 13: Average household daily water consumption (litres)
Type of 
access
Minimum Maximum Mean Total number of respondents
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Private 
Connection 60 80 200 250 110 131 5 8
Yard tap 40 40 100 160 70 95 16 13
Kiosk 40 60 100 100 71 66 3 7
Vendors 20 20 20 20 20 20 1 1
As showed in Table No 13, the highest daily water consumption was found among 
households with private connections, and the lowest among consumers served by 
vendors. The cost may not be a factor determining the level of water consumption, 
because household customers with a private piped supply pay a flat rate per month. 
The cost of water bought from vendors was high, at KSh 7 (US$ 0.09) per 20-litre 
container, and this could be the reason behind the low consumption in this category.
Commercial enterprises with private connections recorded an increase in their 
average daily water consumption of 47 litres from 480 litres to 527 after privatization, 
with a minimum water use of 20 litres per day, and a maximum use of 1,400 litres 
and 2,000 litres before and after privatization respectively. Mean water use for 
consumers with yard taps was constant at 20 litres per day (Table No 14).
Table N° 14: Average commercial daily water consumption (litres)
Type of 
access
Minimum Maximum Mean Total number of respondents
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Private 
Connection 20 20 1,400 2,000 480 527 7 6
Yard tap 20 20 20 20 20 20 2 1
Per capita water consumption was analysed for household consumers by computing 
the total amount of reported daily water consumption divided by the average 
household size. As showed in Chart No 13, there was no change in households with 
private connections, where per capita water consumption remained at 21 litres per 
day. There was a change in per capita water consumption for households using yard 
taps, as it increased from 16.1 litres to 20.9 litres after privatization. Likewise, per capita 
consumption from water kiosks increased from 13 litres to 19.4 litres after privatization. 
The average per capita water consumption for households buying water from vendors 
remained at 20 litres per day.
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Chart N° 13: Per capita household water consumption (litres)
Water quantity
The quantity of water used was assessed to establish whether the water provided 
by the company was enough to meet all user needs. As earlier mentioned, water was 
available for about 12-14 hours a day (daytime only); at night, the supply was closed to 
allow pumping to the storage tank. It was observed that those with connections near 
the water source had a reliable supply. Water shortage was acute during the dry season. 
67 percent of household consumers with private connections conceded that water 
provided by the council was enough for all their water needs, a figure that increased 
to 87 percent after privatization, while 13 percent indicated that it was not enough for 
their daily needs. 83 percent of commercial consumers with private connections were 
satisfied with the amount of water they got. The two institutions indicated that the water 
supply was enough to meet all their needs before and after privatization. The same 
trend was observed in households with yard taps where there was an increase from 
58 percent to 85 percent of respondents indicating that the water supply was enough. 
The respondents of households buying water from kiosks felt that water was 
enough for their daily needs having increased from 33 to 71 percent after privatization. 
The reason for the increased satisfaction of the consumers who indicated that they 
got enough water from the company could be possibly due to improved efficiency 
in operation and maintenance. Those who argued that the water supplied by the 
company was not enough got additional supplies from neighbours, community water 
points (boreholes) or a dam. Table No 15 shows the general consumer perceptions 
about the adequacy of the water supply.
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Table N° 15: Consumers’ perception of the adequacy of water supply, in % and absolute numbers 
(N)
Type of 
main 
supply
Before privatization After privatization
Enough Not enough Totalrespondents Enough Not enough
Total
respondents
Private 
connection
77%
(10) 23% (3)
100%
(13)
87%
(13)
13%
(2)
100%
(15)
Yard tap 62%(8) 38% (5)
100%
(13)
86%
(12)
14%
(2)
100%
(14)
Kiosk 33%(1)
67%
(2)
100%
(3)
82%
(9)
18%
(2)
100%
(11)
Total 19 10 29 34 6 40
The cost of water services
The study established that the consumers could not remember with precision 
the amount of the flat rate before privatization. They gave conflicting figures, some 
indicating it was KSh 200 (US$ 2.6), others KSh 400 (US$ 5.3), and even others KSh 
465 (US$ 6.12). However, Romane Agencies Ltd. confirmed that flat rate charges were 
KSh 400 (US$ 5.3) before privatization and that the new flat rate was KSh 465 (US$ 
6.12). Most household consumers complained over the cost of water, especially the 
monthly flat rate of KSh 465 (US$ 6.12). Among respondents from households with 
private connections, eight in total, 63 percent complained that the cost was high, 25 
percent felt that the cost was fair, while 12 percent indicated that the cost was low. 
Among the ten commercial consumers with private connections, 33 percent complained 
that the cost of water was high, and the remaining 67 percent indicated that the cost 
was fair. The two institutions interviewed reported that the cost of water was high. The 
situation was different for respondents from households using yard connections, 13 
in total, where the landlord included the charges in the house rent. These 
respondents did not care about the cost of water. However, most of the landlords 
renting these properties indicated that the cost was fair, a small number said it was 
high, and one said it was low. The seven respondents dependent on water kiosks 
were charged a fixed rate for 20-litre jerrycans, and they could not remember 
with precision the cost before privatization: 80 percent of these respondents 
indicated that the cost was less than KSh 1 (US$ 0.013) while 20 percent said that 
the cost was KSh 3 (US$ 0.04). After privatization, the cost was KSh 3 per 20-
litre jerrycan (US$ 0.04). 43 percent of these respondents dependent on water 
kiosks reported that the price was fair, 29 percent indicated that it was high, and 
28 percent thought that it was low. These respondents were comparing the cost 
at water kiosks with the cost charged by vendors, who were their alternative 
source in cases of shortage, and charged KSh 7 (US$ 0.09) per 20-litre jerrycan.
Overall level of satisfaction
Summing up, Chart No 14 presents an overall perspective of the respondents’ level 
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of satisfaction with the privati ed water services. Among those users with private 
connections, 57 percent expressed satisfaction with the current services, 14 percent 
About 73 percent of consumers relying on water kiosks expressed satisfaction, while 
27 percent were not satisfied.
Chart N° 14: Consumers’ overall satisfaction with the privati ed water service
The respondents of the survey also made several complaints, which we summarize 
(BG Associates, 2001).
• The private company would have failed to fulfil  its promises to provide an
adequate water supply 24-hour round and were dissatisfied with the rationing
system that supplies water only during day time. Some respondents also
complained about the low pressure in the network, resulting in water shortage
and requiring them to spend time and energy in collecting water from other
sources.
• Many respondents think that the cost of water in the kiosks is too high; hence,
people only buy drinking water in the kiosks and supplement it with water from
a nearby dam for washing clothes and bathing. They also complained that the
water supplied was salty, which forced them to buy spring water for drinking from
vendors who sold it at KSh 7 (US$ 0.09) per 20-litre container.
• Respondents with piped connections were not satisfied with the monthly flat
rate of KSh 465 (US$ 6.12). They consider that the flat rate is unfair, as
it does not reflect the actual amount of water consumed by the
households, and it is prohibitive. Therefore, they claim that there is a need
to introduce a proportional rate of payments to reduce the cost and
reflect the actual consumption.
• Due to water shortages coupled with the need to transport water from long
distances to the water points, water was very expensive in the area and hence
many families had to do with only one or two 20-litre jerr cans per day, an amount
that was inadequate. They felt that if the Health Department was to be strict on
sanitation issues, many small hotels could have been closed since they cannot
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afford to buy enough water for their daily use. 
• Also due to water shortages, people go to the extent of fetching water 
from stagnant water points, resulting in an increase of water-related diseases 
including bilharzias, typhoid, and diarrhoea.
• The respondents observed that the area has abundant water resources 
and that only proper co-ordination and leadership was needed to make 
these resources available to the population. They observed the lack of 
continuity in the privatization project, pointing at the fact that in the early 
days the company drilled several boreholes that were neglected soon 
after. They also observed that the community lacks the courage to 
undertake and manage their own water supply system, but with 
proper training and preparation they could become capable of 
managing it themselves.
• Another significant problem highlighted by the respondents was the lack 
of sewerage services, which is even more important given that Tala Town 
was rapidly expanding.
Summing up findings from Tala Town’s privatization 
The management of Tala Water Supply was leased for 30 years in 1999 to Romane 
Agencies Ltd., a private company that has other business interests including a petrol 
station, a medical clinic, and a school. In effect, some of its employees have dual roles 
in several of these activities. The company did not inherit any workers from the 
Municipal Council water department and did not recruit workers with training in 
water supply. It seems that the daily running of the water supply has not been 
entrusted to professionals, and the service is run mainly as a commercial operation. It 
was not surprising, therefore, to find that there have not been significant 
changes after the privatization, if we consider the needs of Tala Town and not 
just the situation of the small number of consumers served by the company, 
which has not been increased since privatization. As pointed out before, the 
company seems to have concentrated provision in a small area where it is 
profitable to deliver the services and has not showed interest in expanding the 
network.
However, we also found that the company cannot possibly make a profit with the 
current tariffs and the very low customer base. The monthly flat rate of KSh 465 (US
$ 6.12) applied to most consumers is open to abuse and is not representative of the 
amounts of water used. There are users, including households sharing yard 
taps and businesses, which have a higher water consumption than an 
average family but pay the same rate. For example, a huge commercial 
building in the town with restaurants, saloons, offices, a bar, a bank, and a 
Technical College pays a monthly flat rate of KSh 1,500 (US$ 19.7), which is far too 
low for the amount of water used by these activities. Another interesting 
example relates to the petrol station owned by Romane Agencies Ltd., 
which is charged a monthly flat fee of KSh 1,000 (US$ 13.2). This subsidised 
rate may make sense, since the petrol station provides the water company free 
diesel for pumping water in case of electricity failure, but it must be presumed 
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that the balancing of expenses between the two companies does not harm the water 
operation. The above examples demonstrate that there is much need for improvement, 
and a billing arrangement based on the actual amount of water used by each business 
would be required.
The role of water vendors was commendable. There were 10 regular water vendors 
delivering a daily average of 80 to 100 20-litre jerrycans (1,600-2,000 litres) to about 10 
percent of the population, which means that they supply a share of Tala Town population 
equivalent to that served by Romane Agencies Ltd. However, water vendors collect 
water from unprotected sources, paying a fee and transportation costs. Some of the 
consumers that received water from vendors were also served by Romane Agencies 
Ltd., because they preferred to buy spring water from vendors as it was sweet for 
drinking. Most people supplied by water vendors, though, are unserved by the private 
company. The cost of water supplied by the vendors was higher (KSh 7 [US$ 0.09] per 
20-litre container) than the cost at the water kiosks. However, the rate of KSh 3 (US$ 
0.04) per 20-litre jerrycan charged by the company at water kiosks, was higher than 
the price normally charged by vendors in Nairobi, which is KSh 2 (US$ 0.03) per 20-litre 
jerrycan. It is important to notice that most of the customers buying from 
water vendors are in the central part of the market area, where the old piped 
network still exist but has not been repaired by the private company. The fact that 
water vendors have an equal market share than the privatized company represents 
a challenge to Romane Agencies Ltd. to improve its service coverage. Whether 
the company is ready to take up this challenge remains to be seen.
BG Associates (2001) found out that consumers attributed water shortages to 
poor management, lack of maintenance, and political interference. They indicated 
that there are several boreholes that are not utilized, and that despite the many 
studies and proposals carried out over recent years, there has not been any practical 
implementation of solutions. Some consumers thought that the Municipal Council 
should take responsibility and rehabilitate the existing boreholes before sinking 
new ones. Some also argued that the handing over of Tala Water Supply to a private 
company was a short-sighted decision designed to salvage the Municipal Council from 
financial difficulties. They observed that water shortages in Tala Town had worsened 
since the private company took over. They lamented that the council was likely to lose 
public assets to the private company and cautioned that handing over the town’s water 
system should have been done with more care and wide consultation.
Consumers consulted in our research showed awareness of the fact that the water 
supply is insufficient to satisfy demand, and that the result has been water rationing. 
Several suggestions were made by respondents regarding improvements of the current 
situation to ensure that the service is available 24-hour round:
• There is a need to build adequate and large capacity storage reservoirs to ensure
constant supply even in times of power failure.
• The distribution tank should be raised to ensure a better water flow with enough
pressure to reach every customer.
• There is need for another borehole to increase the volume of water supply needed
to cover the whole population of the town.
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• The company should sink a new borehole in a different zone where underground
water is not hard (salty).
• The company should install more powerful pumping machines to increase water
production to cover the entire population of the town.
• More water kiosks should be constructed throughout the town and the cost of
water per 20-litre jerrycan should be reduced to KSh 2 (US$ 0.03).
• All connections should be metered so that consumers pay only for what they
consume.
• There is a need to create a Consumers Committee to articulate the interests of
the consumers in their dealings with the private company.
• Water charges that are currently prohibitive to many users should be reviewed
and conformed to the income of the different groups in the community.
• The private company should hold regular meetings with the community to
respond to emerging needs and issues.
Conclusions
Improving water and sanitation provision is a very long-term activity. Major changes 
require a similarly long-term view. There are many social actors to consider, such as 
the poor, industry, and essential water-based services whose interests need to be 
specifically targeted before success can be claimed. The evidence emerging from the 
two cases provide several lessons and warnings in this regard, which we summarize 
here.
1. User participation. Both in Nyeri Town and Tala Town, consumers were not 
involved in the privatization process. The establishment of NYEWASCO in Nyeri 
Town, and the lease contract signed with Romane Agencies Ltd. in Tala Town 
happened in the absence of consultation or any other form of involvement 
with the community. In both cases, respondents to our surveys demanded the 
involvement of all relevant stakeholders.
2. Investment. Both companies have invested in the expansion of services and 
other operational activities.
a. In Nyeri Town, NYEWASCO has been investing in the expansion and other 
operations within the water and sanitation system through the use of internally 
generated funds. The Company has recently awarded a US$ 10 million contract 
for the expansion of the existing water supply system from 6,580 to 25,536 m3/
day through a loan from KfW.
b. Romane Agencies inherited an accumulated unpaid electricity bill of about 
US$ 12,000 that has already been cleared. The company has also completed 
the drilling and equipping of a new borehole, connecting the new system to the 
existing distribution lines and built some communal water points. The company
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has improved the reticulation by unblocking old pipes and replacing old uPVC 
pipes with GI pipes.
3. Workforce. The experiences of Nery and Tala towns were very different in terms 
of their handling of employees at privatization.
a. In Nyeri, NYEWASCO, absorbed all 160 staff members who were working in 
the municipal company, with a target to reduce the number to 118 employees. The 
company embarked on retrenchment through natural attrition and, by early 2003, 
the number stood at 134.
b. In Tala Town, Romane Agencies Ltd., despite lacking management experience 
in water services, did not inherit any employees from the municipal company and 
did not recruit staff with relevant expertise. The services therefore were run by 
unexperienced staff.
4. Insufficiency and unreliability of services. Consumers in both towns reported that 
they were still dependent on alternative, often unsafe water sources (i.e. private 
water vendors, neighbours, dams, or directly from adjacent rivers), because of 
the unreliability or insufficiency of services. Raw river water was mainly used for 
washing clothes and bathing. The response from the private operators to these 
problems was dissimilar.
a. NYEWASCO made improvements to the reliability of the services. In Nyeri 
Town, the percentage of consumers who depended on water kiosks and other 
alternative sources was reduced from 76.9 to 67.7 percent.
b. Romane Agencies Ltd. did not make significant improvements, and water 
rationing continued. In Tala Town, the percentage of consumers who depended 
on water kiosks increased from 7.7 to 26.8 percent after privatization.
c. However, both companies improved their response to operation and   
maintenance problems.
5. Customer care, billing and revenue collection. Respondents to our surveys 
acknowledged that billing and revenue collection improvements were attained 
by the private companies, as they received correct bills regularly.
6. Daily water consumption. The average per capita daily water consumption in 
both towns increased after privatization, although it remained low or even 
below international standards. The amount for Nyeri Town was slightly above the 
WHO minimum recommendation of 20 litres per capita per day (22 to 23 litres), 
whereas for Tala Town the consumption was below the minimum quantity (13 to 
19 litres).
7. Cost of water for consumers. Consumers indicated that the cost of water 
increased after privatization in both case studies. The tariff applied by water 
vendors and kiosks was much higher than the tariff available for piped household 
connections. Many respondents complained abou the high cost of water, which 
according to reports from other studies would represent between 5-9 percent of 
total household expenditure.
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8. Overall customer satisfaction. Despite complaints on the high cost of water for
both case studies, consumers were generally satisfied with the quality, quantity
and reliability of water supply provided by the companies.
The privatization of water services has a track record of skyrocketing prices, water 
quality problems, deteriorating service, and a loss of control. Privatization advocates 
argue that switching from publicly-owned and operated utilities to private sector firms 
will lead to greater economic efficiency, stabilized rates, reduced public debt and 
improved budgetary management. However, water has been regarded as a social good, 
and it is part of the political culture that the provision of WSS is a State obligation. 
Citizens, administrators and politicians regard water utilities as naturally existing to 
fulfill that social role. Moreover, water utilities are significant employers and 
instruments of political patronage. The social costs of transitional reform from 
subsidized public enterprises to privatization could be considerable, especially 
for users who were previously protected. Under public sector management the 
government subsidizes the prices of consumables, but this support is lost when the 
utilities are privatized. There is no doubt that privatization leads to job losses in the 
short run. However, the heavy social cost incurred in the process is not only a matter 
of job losses, but also an issue involving higher prices to be paid as a result of 
subsidy removals or reductions, the ending of privileged access to the supply of 
consumables and loss of income. In the former centrally planned economies of 
Eastern Europe, it has been possible to lessen such difficulties by the creation of 
social safety-nets, at least for the unemployed and other vulnerable groups, and this 
has helped maintain some public support for the reforms. There is less scope for 
such provisions in Kenya, however, because of past and present economic 
deterioration, structural poverty, and the narrowness of the tax base. The difficulty of 
compensating losers could erode public support and credibility. The public sector 
maintains the responsibility for the consultation of stakeholders and the protection of 
consumers. There are a variety of ways to ensure that consumers are protected 
but it seems clear that the responsibility for this protection consistently rests with 
the State. The public sector may discharge this responsibility through the 
monitoring of customer contracts, the facilitation of customer stakeholder groups and 
customer consultation, and/or specific regulatory protection for consumer rights.
Nevertheless, we have already noted that privatization cause short-and medium-term 
costs and these increased costs often provoke explosive political opposition. For 
example, the resistance to increased food prices has been especially marked in urban 
areas of Kenya, where large numbers of the urban poor are disproportionately 
affected. This group of urban dwellers resist food price increases, not simply because 
they cannot afford the price increases but also because they object the escalation of 
prices leading them to spend a higher proportion of their income in food than more 
affluent groups. The real incomes of the poor are severely reduced by these price 
hikes and they are pushed further into malnutrition and increased urban poverty. The 
indication emerging from our case studies that PSP of essential water services has 
increased prices to the point that the water bill can take between 5 and 9 percent of 
household incomes is a clear warning in this regard.
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Acronyms
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
BOD Biological Oxygen Demand
BOD5 BOD measured over 5 days
CAACs Catchment Area Advisory Committees
CBOs Community Based Organizations
CBWs Community Based Water Supplies
CMT Corporate Management Team
COD Chemical Oxygen Demand
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GI Galvanized iron
GOK Government of Kenya
GTZ German Agency for Technical Co-operation 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IGF Internally generated funds 
ICPSK Institute of Certified Public Secretaries of Kenya
IIED International Institute for Environment and Development
KEWI Kenya Water Institute
KfW German Development Bank
KSh Kenya Shilling
KVDA Kerio Valley Development Authority
KWS Kenya Wildlife Service
LBDA Lake Basin Development Authority
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MENR Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
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MOA  
MOH  
MOLG 
MWRMD  
NACC 
NARC 
NGO 
NIC  
NPEP 
NYEWASCO 
NWCPC  
NWSS 
LA  
O&M 
PFP  
PPP 
PRINWASS 
PSP 
SSIP 
SWOT 
TARDA 
UFW 
uPVC 
US$ 
UWASAM 
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Local Government  
Ministry of Water Resources Management and Development 
National AIDS Control Council
National Rainbow Coalition
Non-Governmental Organization
Newly Industrialized Country
National Poverty Eradication Plan
Nyeri Water and Sewerage Company 
National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation 
National Water Services Strategy
Local Authorities 
Operation and Maintenance
Policy Framework Papers
Public-private partnership
Project “Barriers to and conditions for the involvement of private 
capital and enterprise in water supply and sanitation in Latin 
America and Africa: Seeking economic, social and environmental 
sustainability”
Private Sector Participation 
Small Scale Independent Providers
Strengths – Weaknesses – Opportunities – Threats
Tana River Development Authority
Unaccounted for water 
Polyelectrolyte Vinyl Chloride
United States Dollars
Urban Water and Sanitation Management Program
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WHO 
WRMA 
WRM 
WSBs 
WSDs 
WSPs 
WSRB 
WSRS 
WSRSC 
WSOU 
WSS 
WSTF 
WUAs 
WWAP 
World Health Organization
Water Resources Management Authority 
Water Resources Management 
Water Services Boards
Water and Sanitation Departments 
Water Services Providers
Water Services Regulatory Board 
Water Sector Reform Secretariat
Water Sector Reforms Steering Committee 
Water and Sewerage Operation Unit 
Water Supply and Sanitation
Water Services Trust Fund
Water Users Associations
World Water Assessment Programme
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Appendix 1: WSS Resource Flows Matrix, Expenditures in 2000-01 (million US$)
Channels of Finance
Public Service Providers Other Providers
Total
MENR NW-CPC
Local 
Auth.
Local 
Utilities
CBOs/ 
SHGs PSPs
Government of Kenya – 
budget 28.5 4.0 2.7 0.9 36.0
Recurrent 16.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.2
Development 12.3 4.0 2.7 0.9 19.8
Local authority budget 16.8 16.8
Recurrent 15.7 15.7
Development 1.0 1.0
Off-budget donors / 
NGOs 18.1 18.1
Recurrent 4.5 4.5
Development 13.6 13.6
Internal Generation by 
WSPs 11.2 3.4 1.5 2.5 18.6
Recurrent 11.2 2.9 1.3 2.3 17.8
Development 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.9
Communities/
Households 6.9 6.9
Recurrent na na
Development 6.9 6.9
Total Resources 28.5 15.2 19.4 3.4 27.4 2.5 96.4
Recurrent 16.2 11.2 15.7 2.9 5.8 2.3 54.2
Development 12.3 4.0 3.7 0.5 21.6 0.2 42.2
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Article 2
The experience of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania1
Damas Alfred Mashauri2,  Faculty of Engineering, University of Namibia, Ongwediva, 
Namibia. 
Abstract
The article addresses the process of privatization of the Dar es Salaam Water Supply 
and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA). It provides background information about the 
situation of water and sanitation services in Dar es Salaam during the 1990s and 
discusses the decision of the Tanzanian Government to privatize the public utility 
taken in 1997, as part of far-reaching reforms agreed with international financial 
institutions and development agencies. The article provides details of the difficult 
process of privatization, that took around 6 years to complete, and highlights pros and 
cons associated with the privatization of essential public services in the Tanzanian 
context.
Keywords: water and sanitation, privatization, essential public services, Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania
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Resumen
El artículo da cuenta del proceso de privatización de la Autoridad de Suministro de Agua 
y Cloacas de Dar es Salaam (DAWASA). El mismo provee información contextual sobre 
la situación de los servicios de agua y saneamiento en Dar es Salaam durante la década 
de 1990 y discute la decisión del Gobierno de Tanzania de privatizar la empresa pública, 
tomada en 1997 como parte de reformas de gran alcance acordadas con instituciones 
financieras y agencias de desarrollo internacionales. El artículo da detalles del difícil 
proceso de privatización, que tomó cerca de 6 años, y destaca aspectos positivos y 
negativos asociados con la privatización de servicios públicos esenciales en el contexto 
de Tanzania.
Palabras clave: agua y saneamiento, privatización, servicios públicos esenciales, Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania
Recibido: noviembre de 2017 Aceptado: abril de 2018
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Introduction
In this article we focus on the case of Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania, 
although we also consider information from other experiences around the country. 
Dar es Salaam is a typical city in a poor developing country that is grappling with huge 
infrastructure and efficiency problems. These problems are aggravated by the fact that, 
according to some studies, the city’s population, just over 2.3 million people in 
2002, is more than doubled during daytime, when it can reach up to 5 million people 
owing to the inflow of commuters. The Tanzanian government has been trying to solve 
the crisis in its capital city through different reforms, but the problems have proved too 
stubborn. The agency responsible for the provision of water and sanitation services 
(WSS) in the capital is the Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sewerage Authority 
(DAWASA), created in 1997. The water supply system has for a long time been in a 
poor physical state, inadequate and unable to meet demand, with insufficient 
infrastructure, and poorly co-ordinated. Likewise, the condition of sewerage systems 
is poor with problems ranging from broken/collapsed sewers to poor operation of the 
systems more generally. This has been mainly caused by lack of investment for over a 
quarter of a century, while operation and maintenance have been neglected for many 
years. The lack of financial resources and public sector investment has greatly 
reduced the capacity of local institutions and utility providers to cope with service 
demand. WSS have been particularly constrained with no new investments in mains 
sewerage and wastewater treatment, and limited investment in the water system. 
This has resulted in reduced productivity, weakened competitive advantage in 
attracting investment, and has created a range of environmental hazards. As a result, 
individual land developers, businesses, and communities have implemented their 
own initiatives to service their plots and neighbourhoods, often at a high cost 
(WaterAid, 2002). The assessment of the Government, under the advice of 
international financial institutions and aid agencies, is that the investments needed to 
improve just the situation of the water supply system would require USD 600 million. 
It has concluded that the funding required cannot be easily obtainable from the public 
budget nor through donor assistance, and in 1997, the same year it was 
created, decided to privatize the operations of DAWASA. In fact, the privatization of 
DAWASA was one of the preconditions requested from Tanzania to qualify for 
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The article addresses the process that led to the granting of a Lease Contract 
in 2003, as the first step towards granting a full concession for the operation of Dar 
es Salaam’s WSS to private operators. The research is based on the collection and 
analysis of documentation from DAWASA, mainly annual reports, financial 
statements, etc., interviews with the Managing Director and other representatives of 
the utility, as well as other relevant studies carried out by the University of Dar es 
Salaam, and reports published by the media, a selection of which is presented in 
the Appendix. The first section presents the general context, including a brief account 
of the situation facing Dar es Salaam in relation to WSS. The second section addresses 
the process of privatization of DAWASA. A brief final section discusses preliminary 
scenarios emerging from the process of privatization, which was concluded 
around the time of completing the research.
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The general context
In 2002 Tanzania had a population of around 33.5 million people, of which about 77.5 
percent were in rural areas. The Tanzanian per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
1998 was USD 210, and the rate of GDP growth is estimated to be between 2.7 and 3.5 
percent. Dar es Salaam provides around 19-20 percent of the national GDP, although 
there has been some decline since the 1980s due to the increased importance of the 
agricultural sector, currently contributing over 60 percent of GDP, and to a decline in 
urban industrial development. The total urban population of the country in 2002 was 
estimated at over 7.5 million people, and about 31 percent was placed in the capital city 
of Dar es Salaam, which has a total area of 1,350 km2. Map No 1 shows the location of 
Dar es Salaam and other major cities.
Map N° 1: Map of Tanzania showing the location of the case study
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Dar es Salaam’s experienced rapid population growth over the last few decades, from 
a population of about 129 thousand people in 1957 to the current population of over 2.3 
million people in 2002. The city’s average annual growth rate over a 40-year period 
(1948 to 1988) was 7.7 percent, while during the last decade it has been estimated to be 
around 9 to 10 percent (Government of Tanzania, 1999; WaterAid, 2002). The outcome 
of this growth has been the proliferation of unplanned and unserved areas, primarily 
concentrated along the coastline and four arterial roads that serve as transport and 
service corridors, Morogoro, Bagamoyo, Nyerere (Pugu), and Kilwa. This has led to a 
radial land-development pattern in which prime areas for development are those with 
relatively good infrastructure networks and services, which include the Central Business 
District (CBD), Kariakoo, Upanga, Oysterbay, Masaki, and Magomeni. Between the 
arterial roads there are large areas that are not serviced, and these have developed 
into unplanned settlements. Many of these areas are in hazardous locations such as 
river valleys, flood-prone areas, and hill slopes. This has led to problems in managing 
hazardous sites characterised by soil and gully erosion, deforestation, excessive 
storm-water run-off and landslides, the impacts of sand mining, and solid waste and 
environmental pollution. In addition, servicing these areas is difficult due to the nature 
of the terrain and the density and layout of the settlements.
Unplanned and unserved areas accommodate about 80 percent of the population 
of the city, and 65 percent of new housing is being built in these areas. The growth 
of informal settlements has risen from 16 in the 1970s to 43 in the 1980s, and up to 
55 by the late 1990s. One result of the rapid growth along the main road systems has 
been the intermixing of high, medium and low-density developments, both planned and 
unplanned. These developments have a symbiotic relationship with each other, and this 
has led to low-density housing (2 by 2-hectare plots) mixed with high-density housing 
with 30 to 40 houses per hectare and populations of 250 to 350 residents. This mixture 
of high- and low-density developments has resulted in a series of informal micro trade-
centres and planned service centres, including the university, the airport, a beach hotel 
strip, a national housing complex, etc. Key squatter areas of high population density 
include Manzese on the Morogoro Road, Temeke and Mbagala in the south, and the 
Buguruni and Vingunguti areas along the Mandela Highway and the Nyerere Road, 
respectively. Living conditions in squatter areas vary greatly, but access roads, where 
they exist, are generally inadequate and in very poor condition. The provision of basic 
services like water and sanitation, drainage, solid waste management, and pedestrian 
facilities is mostly unavailable (WaterAid, 2002).
The existing health system in Dar es Salaam has shown progressive deterioration 
in recent years due to a combination of budgetary and resource constraints, and an 
expanding urban population. Statistics derived from the Dar es Salaam City Council 
(DCC) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (1997), indicate that
several clear and serious public health trends have emerged during the 1990s:
• a rise from 46 to 62 percent of total reported cases of disease between 1991 and
1995;
• an increase in water-borne and faecal-related diseases from 8 to 12 percent out
of the total cases of disease recorded between 1991 and 1995. Some estimates
suggest that water-borne diseases may now constitute between 15-20 percent of
total recorded diagnoses in Dar es Salaam. The worst affected areas of the city are
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Kinondoni and Temeke, and the incidence appears to be closely related to areas 
with poor water supply and sanitation, where flooding is also frequent;
• the types of disease considered here are strongly associated with the conditions 
arising from poor water quality, inadequate sanitation, and cross contamination 
of water supply (most commonly in the case of shallow wells) by dispersion from 
pit latrines and leakage within the sewerage system;
•  the low quality of life for the poorest households in the areas of Temeke, Ilala, 
and Kinondoni is reflected in the infant mortality rate (for children under one year 
old). This rate is probably in excess of 140 per 1,000 live births, compared to the 
official national infant mortality rate of 85/1,000.
Significant as water-related diseases are, both in relation to public and occupational 
health, the health concern of overriding national and regional importance is the prevalence 
and growth of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. This has critical economic, social, demographic 
and cultural implications for the future of the nation. At the end of 1997 the estimated 
number of adult and children infected was 1.4 million (9.42 percent of the population). In 
practice, the infection rates vary greatly between communities, age groups, and socio-
economic conditions and range between 0 and 61 percent of the population. AIDS is 
now in many communities the principal cause of premature death. Important high-risk 
groups of relevance include transient and migrant labour, and specifically transport 
and construction workers. In the latter groups, during the 1991-93 period HIV infection 
rates were estimated to be between 22 and 31 percent. This high level of infection is 
associated with sexual behaviour among workers (such as construction workers for 
development projects) housed in all-male environments, spending extended periods 
away from their families (WHO-UNAIDS, 1998).
In Tanzania’s urban centres, and particularly in Dar es Salaam, there is a common 
socio-economic category comprising male-only households, either single or joint. This 
forms a specific group of water users, with associated cultural water-use patterns. The 
domestic water-supply needs of this group are generally catered for by water vendors, 
due to the cultural taboo of men being seen collecting water. These groups are obliged 
to pay the high prices set by water vendors in order to have water delivered to them. 
Ironically water vending and water resale are almost done exclusively by men. It is 
strange that women are not expected to take part in water vending but fetch water for 
the family all the same. In this regard, women in the urban areas are found to form an 
increasing proportion of the lowest income groups and bear a disproportionate share of 
the cost and responsibility for household maintenance and child rearing. According to 
a recent report from the World Bank, female-headed households constitute 13.1 percent 
of the urban and peri-urban population of Dar es Salaam. In the city, female-headed 
households represent a particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged group, primarily 
engaged in the informal sector, in activities that include food vending and brewing, 
which use large amounts of water and have hygiene implications. When the water 
supply fails, women are then dependent on water vendors for their needs. Women’s 
expenditure generally goes towards meeting household and family needs, including 
health centre and medical costs. For low-income female-headed households, this 
represents a particularly high proportion of their income (World Bank, 1993). In densely 
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populated, unplanned low-income areas like Temeke, Ilala, and Kinondoni, water 
collection represents a significant opportunity cost for women in terms of the amount of 
time required for its collection, and the consequent loss of opportunity for other income 
earning activities.
The situation of water and sanitation services
The Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA) is the largest 
urban water and sewerage utility in Tanzania, with about 1,500 employees distributed in 
various departments and activities. It is a public utility created in 1997 from the merger 
of the Parastatal National Urban Water Authority (NUWA) and the former Dar es Salaam 
Sewerage and Sanitation Division (DSSD). NUWA was created in 1981, during the days 
of the socialist government of Tanzania when most public services (health, education) 
were provided for free and water was no exception. Its role was to develop and operate 
water supply systems in the country’s 19 main urban centres. The national government 
provided the subsidies that paid for construction costs and most of the operation and 
maintenance costs. DAWASA is a Public Corporation established by statute, the Dar es 
Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority Act 1981, as amended in 1989, 1999 and 2001. 
The Government of Tanzania wholly owns it. It is responsible for the provision of water 
supply and sewerage services in the Greater Dar es Salaam area covering Dar es Salaam 
and part of the Coastal Region (Kibaha and Bagamoyo). DAWASA currently has about 
86,000 customers but, as explained below, there also many unauthorised connections. 
The remainder of the population obtains its water through informal supplies, often 
of suspicious quality and always at a price well above the average tariff charged by 
DAWASA. The sewerage system in Dar es Salaam covers only a small area of the city 
centre, basically the CBD. Most sanitation facilities in the city, where there are any, 
are on-site and dependent on trucks that pump out and take the sludge to disposal 
sites when the systems get filled. However, often these trucks cannot gain access to 
the areas where most poor people live (WaterAid, 2001). Map No 2 shows DAWASA’s 
service area.
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Map N° 2:  DAWASA’s water sources and service area
Dar es Salaam has used the Ruvu River as its main water source since the 1950s, and 
has two pumping stations, the Upper Ruvu with a present capacity of about 81 m3/d, 
and the Lower Ruvu with a higher capacity of 182 m3/d. Other sources which are being 
used are the Mtoni Water Works to the south of the city with a capacity of about 9 m3/d, 
and ground water. A supplementary water supply of 6 m3/d is taken from the Kizinga 
River. The water is treated at the Upper and Lower Ruvu Water Treatment Plants, and 
the Mtoni Water Treatment Plant south of the city (WaterAid, 2002; PSRC, 2003). In the 
present context, the area considered in the privatization project discussed in this article 
extends from the Ruvu Basin, as the primary source of water supply, to the urban and 
peri-urban areas of Dar es Salaam where the bulk of the proposed rehabilitation works 
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will be undertaken (Map No 2).
Considering existing abstraction rates and projected urban population growth, it is 
accepted that the Ruvu water resource alone will not be able to safely meet the increased 
demand from the city in the next decade, in the absence of river regulation. During the 
1990s, the Government, with support from international institutions and cooperation 
agencies, carried out several initiatives to improve the situation of WSS in the capital. 
These include:
• 1990 – a study by Lodigiani S.P.A., financed by the Italian Government, on the
rehabilitation of the Upper Ruvu Water Works, and part of the distribution system;
• 1991 – a study financed by JICA on the rehabilitation of the entire water distribution
system, and refurbishing the Mtoni and Lower Ruvu Waterworks;
• 1994 – a study also financed by JICA on water resources development in the Ruvu
River Basin, with special attention to the regulation of the Ruvu River for improving
Dar es Salaam’s water supply;
• 1994 – a study by Reid Crowther, financed by the Canadian Agency for International
Development (CIDA), focusing on the renovation and expansion of the Lower
Ruvu Water Treatment Plant;
• 1995 – a study funded by the African Development Bank (AfDB), that DAWASA
commissioned to Howard Humphreys Ltd. This was a feasibility study with
detailed designs and tender documents for the rehabilitation of the Dar es Salaam
Water Supply System, and to prepare a long-term development plan for the water
distribution system (this study did not include the Upper Ruvu, which had been
rehabilitated in 1990 with Italian funding, and did not include planning for water
resource development either);
•  1996 – a study carried out by Messrs SERVICEPLAN of Dar es Salaam, to
investigate potential water resources from the Mzinga and Kizinga rivers south
of Dar es Salaam, as well as the potential for groundwater development in the
southern part of the city. The study proposed building a dam on the Mzinga River,
which would yield about 66,000 m3/d.
Currently, options for alternative water resources include the development of a 
riverside storage or impoundment on the Upper Ruvu aimed at capturing peak wet 
season run-off and releasing this through the dry season. Based on proposals under 
discussion to rehabilitate the existing intake and treatment facilities with no additional 
abstraction from either the Upper or Lower Ruvu, the Lower Ruvu basin would have 
adequate supplies to sustain current demand. An important consideration though is 
water quality. The two main surface water sources, the Ruvu and Kizinga, carry a high-
suspended sediment load. The low alkalinity of raw water at the treatment plant intakes 
has implications for the treatment process which further reduces alkalinity. Because 
of equipment failures within the treatment facilities, the transmission pipes have been 
corroded and weakened in places by leaching of calcareous material. Low levels of 
treatment and equipment failure have consequently resulted in treated water quality 
that does not comply with the drinking water standards. This is compounded by the 
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lack of physical, chemical and bacteriological monitoring data due to financial and other 
constraints.
Water from the Ruvu River is pumped through two main transmission lines that 
extend some 70 km to the city’s holding reservoirs. As already mentioned, DAWASA’s 
area of supply covers not only the city but also the villages and townships on the route 
of the two transmission mains. The approximate length of existing mains in the city is 
about 824 km, with 237 km of primary distribution and 587 km of secondary distribution 
mains (PSRC, 2003). Transmission losses en route are high and are estimated to be 
114 m3/d, of which 61 m3/d are losses incurred due to infrastructure decay. The Upper 
Ruvu transmission line has a capacity of 80 m3/d. However, the steel pipes are badly 
corroded where they have been laid across swampy areas. In addition, the line is heavily 
tapped to supply villages and settlements en route. The Lower Ruvu transmission line, 
was laid in 1976 with a life expectancy of 20 years, has a design capacity of 182 m3/d 
and is made from pre-stressed concrete pipes. In recent years the line has suffered 
two major bursts at river crossings. El Nino rains caused extensive flooding in 1998 
that damaged the pipeline. This line is heavily tapped to supply the town of Bagamoyo, 
other villages and for irrigation agriculture. It is estimated that 35 m3/d of water is lost 
along the transmission lines due to unauthorized use, primarily in irrigation agriculture. 
A further 18 m3/d is drawn off to supply an estimated 150,000 people who reside in 
villages and settlements along the transmission lines (WaterAid, 2002). DAWASA also 
provides water from the distribution mains at standpipes located around the city. There 
is no charge for this water, which is used by individuals, as well as by water vendors who 
charge their customers for transporting the water (PSRC, 2003).
The sewerage system of Dar es Salaam is really a collection of independent micro-
systems, rather than a fully integrated network. The systems are, in theory at least, of 
the separate type and have been developed since the 1950s. The CBD and immediate 
surrounding areas are served by a sewer network that empties into the ocean via an 
outfall. Other sewered sectors of the city are mostly centred on institutional areas such 
as the Lugalo Barracks, Mgulani, Kurasini, Mabibo, Mikocheni, Vingunguti, and the 
University of Dar es Salaam.  The sewage from these areas is treated in stabilization 
ponds and then discharged to rivers, natural streams or to open sewers.  All systems are 
a combination of both gravity and pumped flow (PSRC, 2003). The sewerage systems of 
Dar es Salaam comprise the following major components:
• nine stabilization pond sites
• fifteen sewage pumping stations
• approximately 170 km of gravity sewer and pumping mains
• a 1 km-long, 1,000 mm diameter ocean outfall and screening house
• three depots with office, workshop and storage facilities.
In addition, there are some 19 different organizations, which collect waste from 
septic tanks, pit latrines, etc. (PSRC, 2003).
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The privatization of water and sanitation services in Dar es Salaam
As explained earlier, under the advice of international institutions in 1997 the 
Government of Tanzania decided to privatize DAWASA, as a solution to the problems 
facing WSS in the capital. DAWASA’s privatization was also a condition that Tanzania 
had to accept in order to qualify for the World Bank-IMF initiative for Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC). The decision to privatize was taken after several years of 
institutional reforms and assessments of the situation. In 1991 the government had 
announced a “new water policy” for Tanzania. This was in line with a national policy 
started in 1992 focused on restructuring state-owned enterprises, which led to the 
creation of a specific institution, the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission 
(PSRC). The PSRC was charged with leading the promotion of private sector participation 
to run the country’s public utilities, railways and ports. In this context, the urban water 
supply and sanitation sector (UWSS) has undergone considerable reforms in the last 
five years. Prior to these reforms, the government was collecting water fees as one of 
its revenue sources and, in turn, was giving out funds from its budget for running and 
maintaining WSS. Normally, the amount of money issued by the Government was less 
than the revenue collected and was by far less than the money required for running and 
maintenance of these essential services (Swere, 2001). Before 1994, urban water supply 
activities were run as part of the office of the Regional Water Engineer (RWE), and 
under this arrangement budgetary allocation for UWSS was given low priority with 
respect to other activities. In 1994 the Government decided to establish independent 
Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Departments (UWSSDs), and to allow them to 
retain the revenue collected through the sale of water and related services to meet 
their operational and maintenance costs (Swere, 2001). However, in 1997 new legal 
and institutional reforms were carried out to transform the UWSSDs into autonomous 
authorities, Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Authorities (UWSAs), under the existing 
Board of Directors. These reforms made the Boards more independent and 
autonomous in running the affairs of the authorities. UWSAs were ran on a self-
financing basis and were set up in each of Tanzania’s 18 urban centres, including Dar 
es Salaam. The transformation of water utilities into authorities was meant to 
strengthen financial management, billing and collection capacities. A World Bank-
funded Urban Sector Rehabilitation Programme implemented in 1997 by the 
Ministry of Finance provided capacity building in nine of the UWSAs, Arusha, Moshi, 
Mwanza, Tanga, Shinyanga, Dodoma, Mbeya, Iringa, and Morogoro. At the end of 
1997, all UWSAs recorded substantial losses and were unable to meet their recurrent 
expenditure costs, but by the year 2000 significant improvements were recorded, 
particularly in revenue collection, with an overall increase of 74 percent across all 
UWSAs. By then, four UWSAs, Arusha, Moshi, Tanga, and Mwanza, became able to 
meet all their Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and staffing costs (MoF, 2001; 
WaterAid, 2002).
The process of DAWASA’s privatization
The Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA) was created as 
the capital city’s UWSA in 1997, and in the same year the Government took the decision 
to privatize it. The main reasons given for the decision to privatize DAWASA included 
addressing the utility’s 1) inadequate management capacity, 2) high water losses 
and old age infrastructure, and 3) inadequate financial resources for investment. The 
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PSRC issued the terms of reference soliciting bids from private operators, named as 
International Professional Partners (IPPs), and seven IPPs showed interest, of which four 
pre-qualified, two were denied a time extension and therefore did not submit a bid, and 
one was disqualified. Each of the four pre-qualified IPPs offered different arrangements 
including a management contract, a lease and a concession. It proved impossible to 
ascertain which was the “best” submission, and it was decided that supplementary 
information was needed to reach a common ground for comparison. In June 1998, the 
PSRC created a technical committee called DAWASA Divestiture Technical Committee 
(DTT), which was charged with preparing a Supplementary Information Paper (SIP) 
for a new bidding process. The DTT included members from DAWASA, the ministries 
responsible for water, finance, and planning, the Attorney General’s Chambers, and 
the PSRC itself. Since a process of privatization of this nature was completely new in 
Tanzania, an international consultant with experience in privatization of utilities was 
appointed to assist the PSRC in the exercise. UK-based divestiture advisers Severn Trent 
Water International (STWI) were recruited under a competitive process and appointed in 
June 1998 to assist in the preparation of the SIP. 
The process of revision of the original privatization project led to a new strategy, 
which was approved by the Government in November 1998 and enacted by law in 1999 
(Swere, 2001). This legislation provided for the creation of a Public Granting Authority 
(PGA), which would own DAWASA’s assets on behalf of the Government and lease them 
to a Private Operator (PO), once the privatization procedures are completed. Its main 
functions are to 1) lease DAWASA’s assets to a PO, 2) implement a capital investment 
program (the financing for infrastructure rehabilitation and improvement has already 
been secured, as explained below), 3) develop new water sources and hand over these to 
the PO, and 4) monitor the performance of the PO. The revised strategy also introduced 
the requirement that the international investor should create a local company with at 
least 20 percent of the shares held by local investors (Hall, Bayliss and Lobina, 2002). 
Later the Government also decided to create a multi-utility regulator for energy and 
water utilities, the Energy and Water Regulatory Authority (EWURA), whose legislation 
was eventually enacted in 2001. This was in accordance with preparatory work for the 
privatization of public utilities. To assist the Government in the implementation of the 
privatization process, the World Bank provided funding through the Programmatic 
Structural Adjustment Credit (PSAC) Programme (2000-2004). The stated purpose of 
this programme is “to assist in the completion of the privatisation of the main strategic 
public enterprises, particularly in infrastructure services, which have significant bearing 
on the cost of doing business” (WaterAid, 2002; World Bank, 2000).
In relation to DAWASA, the specific objectives set for the bidding process were: 1) to 
obtain new technology, 2) to improve efficiency of operations and maintenance, and 
3) to obtain and access funding for system rehabilitation and improvement. The new 
strategy was to implement the privatization of DAWASA in two stages. The first stage 
involved completing the lease of DAWASA to a PO for at least 10 years. During this 
stage, DAWASA would have its infrastructure rehabilitated and improved, while the PO 
was expected to improve operation and management. The second stage envisaged 
further improvement of infrastructure and management, and after that the privatization 
status of DAWASA would change from lease to concession (Swere, 2001). I summarize 
below key points of the new strategy for DAWASA’s bidding process in 1999:
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• The International Professional Partner (IPP) or preferred bidder will form a local
Private Operator (PO) with the IPP having a minimum shareholding of 51 percent,
and local investors a minimum of 20 percent. The onus is on the IPP to identify its
local partners. The PO will have a minimum equity of USD 2.5 million.
• DAWASA will be responsible for most of the capital investment programme, and
the immediate requirement is estimated at USD 120 million.  It will be responsible
for securing financing and subsequent debt servicing. It will enter into a lease
contract with the Private Operator to run the water supply and sewerage services
and monitor the performance of the Private Operator.
• There will be a Development Contract between the Ministry of Finance and
DAWASA, which will set out conditions for preparing short- and medium-term
investment programmes, consolidated financial forecasts, financing plans,
requests for adjusting consumer rates, and procedures for budgeting and paying
water bills of public agencies.
• The Government will enter into credit agreements with four co-financiers: the
World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) and the Agence Française de Développement (AfD) to cover the immediate
investment programme and lend these funds to DAWASA.
Thus, under the revised strategy, the dilapidated infrastructure was to be rehabilitated 
by DAWASA with funding from international loans taken by the Government. The winning 
bidder was expected only to cover the cost of “metres and standpipes”, thereby securing 
its future invoicing. Therefore, the private operator would not take responsibility for the 
infrastructure until it had been improved by the Tanzanian government with funding 
from international loans (Bayliss, 2002).
In February 1999, the PSRC held a Local Investors meeting to explain the process and 
discuss their potential involvement. Later, in May 1999, it circulated a draft SIP with pre-
qualification documentation to the IPPs, which was extended to the two IPPs that had 
finally declined to participate in 1997, the UK-based United Water and Thames Water. 
The draft included the text of a development contract, a lease contract, a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU), and a customer contract. After receiving comments from 
the potential bidders, the final SIP was issued on 20 August 1999, which opened the 
tender process for a ten-year lease. The PSRC issued an information memorandum for 
local investors in September 1999, and 11 local firms expressed interest, including CDC, 
First Capital Partners, and PROPARCO, which were not approved for participation in 
the tender. Further issues raised by the bidders, and the withdrawal of the UK-based 
IPPs United Water,  Thames Water, Northumbria Water, together with the decline in 
interest from the other UK-based bidder, Biwater Plc., resulted in the need to amend the 
SIP once again. Therefore, in October 1999 the PSRC held meetings with the bidders in 
London, and subsequently issued a major addendum to the final version of the SIP in 
November 1999. The deadline for bid submission that was originally set for 11 November 
1999, was extended to 10 January 2000, and then to 31 January 2000. Finally, only the 
two French IPPs, Saur International and Vivendi (formerly Générale des Eaux), submitted 
their bids, but the Government rejected both on grounds that the financial aspects were 
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non-compliant with the requirements.
In June 2000 it was decided to carry out a full re-bid open to all international water 
operators, and the pre-qualification process for the re-bid started in September 2000, 
with a deadline for the submission of expressions of interest and pre-qualification 
documents set for 3 January 2001. Sixteen IPPs responded to the call, but only 8 
completed their submission, and of these only 3 were accepted in September 2001. 
The three international pre-qualified bidders were UK-based Biwater Plc. jointly with 
JBG Gauff from Germany, and the two French IPPs, Saur International and Vivendi. The 
final tender documents were sent to the pre-qualified bidders on 7 February 2002, and 
the deadline for the submission of the bids was set on 27 May 2002. However, owing 
to some issues arising, several meetings with the pre-qualified IPPs were held in March 
and June 2002 to discuss the details of the process. As a result, the deadline for the 
submission of the bids was first postponed until 15 July 2002, and then to 31 July 2002 
(PSRC, 2003). This time the process was completed, and the selected bidder was the 
joint venture formed by Biwater Plc. and JBG Gauff, with the local partner MS City Water 
Services Ltd., which has 20 percent of the shares. The contract documents for the lease 
were signed in March 2003, and the operator took over the operations from DAWASA in 
July 2003. The functions of the private operator agreed by contract are 1) operating and 
maintaining the greater Dar es Salaam water supply and sewerage system, 2) collecting 
first-time connection charges and revenue from billing, and 3) implementing delegated 
works.  
The Customer Tariff to be charged will be the sum of the “PO tariff” plus the “DAWASA 
Tariff”, and the PO will retain the share corresponding to the PO Tariff. The PO Tariff will 
be fixed for the first five years of the Lease Contract and will be adjusted according 
to a cost-indexed formula to reflect inflation; it will be renegotiated before the end of 
year five. The DAWASA Tariff will cover DAWASA’s operating costs, the service of the 
debt taken by the Government, and a contribution to the capital expenditure program. 
These conditions are compatible with the Development Contract, which reflects the 
results of surveys among the population assessing their willingness to pay for WSS. The 
Customer Tariff structure will be designed to favour connection to and consumption of 
piped water by low-income households. To that effect, the PO will operate a “Connection 
Fund” replenished by a surcharge on the Customer Tariff that will be used to finance the 
construction of small-diameter connections for low-income households. In order to help 
these customers, there will be a special rate termed “life line tariff”, specifically for the 
first five cubic metres (5 m3) of water consumed every month. The PO will create a fund 
aimed at connecting residential customers to the water supply network free of charge, 
up to 20 metres (for a 0.5-inch pipe) from the main pipes. Customers will be required 
to pay the difference when the distance exceeds the 20 metres. The connection charge 
will be deducted from water bills.
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Conclusions: brief discussion of prospects for WSS in Tanzania 
The research that provided the basis for this article ended around the time that 
the DAWASA Lease Contract was finally signed in 2003, after almost six years since the 
Government launched the project to privatize the water utility. Therefore, the conclusions 
do not provide an assessment of the performance and results of the initiative, which is 
in its early days. However, we carried out a SWOT analysis based on the information 
available about the DAWASA experience, including some updated details like the final 
amount secured from international funding institutions for the privatization process, 
and some inputs from other experiences around the country. Table No 1 presents a 
synthetic account of the analysis.
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Table N° 1: SWOT analysis of the prospects for Dar es Salaam’s WSS under the Lease arrangement
Strengths (S) Weaknesses (W)
• Securing international funding for USD 164
million for rehabilitation projects.
• Involvement of international parties in the
arrangement.
• Involvement of International Private Partner 
(IPP) providing extra management capacity.
• Incentivizing responsiveness and 
accountability from the Private Operator 
through imposing financial penalties in 
case of failure to meet key performance 
targets. 
• Clarity on the duration of contract and
procedures for its termination.
• Inclusion of “life line tariffs” of 5 m3 per
month for domestic water customers in the
contract.
• Plans to improve the quality of water supply
and effluent discharges.
• Potential reduction of customer expenditure 
for buying water after improvements are
completed.
• Time spent for domestic water collection to
be reduced.
• High willingness to pay for water observed
from water customers.
• Plans to expand WSS coverage.
• Plans to improve WSS quality.
• Plans to install meters to control
consumption and charge accordingly.
• Plans to reduce unaccounted for water.
• Plans to rehabilitate WSS infrastructure
• Lack of competition in the bidding process.
• Conflicts of interest between the Tanzanian 
Government and donors.
• Low water price set in tendering process.
• Inexperience of DAWASA to work with a Private 
Operator.
• Delay in the establishment of EWURA.
• Inexperience of EWURA to set tariffs and give 
licenses.
• Absence of financial penalties to DAWASA.
• Inadequate co-ordination between DAWASA and 
the Private Operator.
• Poor staffing procedures for both DAWASA and 
the Private Operator.
• Over staffing by the Private Operator (14 
employees per 1,000 connections instead of 3 
employees per 1,000 connections).
• Inadequate adjustments of the customer tariffs 
after it was fixed for the coming 5 years.
• Presence of huge debts left by DAWASA.
• Presence of huge debts left by former DAWASA 
customers.
• Difficulties to exercise control over multinational 
water companies.
• The Lease Contract has nothing to do with 
investment.
• The new arrangement implies a high-salary scale 
for foreigners but a low-salary scale for locals.
• The Private Operator is not concerned with 
customers, but with profit making.
• Domination of foreign companies in the bidding 
due to weak local private-sector capacity.
• Insufficient evidence and experience to predict 
the chances of success for the Lease.
• Difficulties in the administration of the Lease 
Contract.
• High chance of conflict between DAWASA and 
the PO due to absence of proper regulation.
• Water demand is higher than the available 
supply.
• Lack of funding to expand water networks to 
un-serviced areas.
• The public was not properly informed of the 
privatization process.
• Small private water vendors will lose their jobs 
and revenue.
• Households selling water will lose revenue.
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Opportunities (O) Threats / Limitations (T/L)
• Political willingness to involve a Private 
Operator.
• Donor willingness to fund the 
development project.
• Political stability of Tanzania.
• Opportunity to encourage new 
entrepreneurs.
• Reduced Government intervention.
• Acquisition of new technologies and 
skills.
• The water sector will be run by a private 
company on a commercial basis.
• The Lease Contract is a step towards 
granting a Concession.
• Political interference on the regulatory authority 
EWURA.
• Withdrawal of the Private Operator because of 
low profitability.
• Low discipline of Government’s agencies in 
paying their water bills.
• Insufficient cash generation for investment after 
the funds available through loans are used.
• Influence of DAWASA’s bad reputation in 
reducing the credibility to comply with its duties.
• Absence of an environmental protection law.
• Absence of a new water law that could encourage 
and protect the rights of the Private Operator.
• The essential National Interest on the water 
sector is no longer protected.
• Foreign control of Dar es Salaam’s WSS has been 
made possible by allowing the international 
Private Operator to have a higher share holding 
up to 80%, and limiting the share allowed to the 
local partner up to 49%.
• The process will transform public property into 
private property that could be concentrated in a 
few hands.
• Difficulties in implementing government water 
policies.
• Under investment in sanitation.
• Profit obtained from billing collection will be 
channelled out of the country.
• Difficulties in finding a new source of funds after 
utilising the available USD 164 million.
Although the Table shows several strengths and opportunities, given that there 
is a recognition of the need for far-reaching reforms in the country’s WSS sector, it 
also reflects many weaknesses, threats, and limitations in the ongoing 
experience. There is no doubt that the Government has showed commitments 
towards the implementation of serious transformations to improve the situation in 
the water sector. The introduction of reforms promoting private sector participation 
has become the main opportunity made available for improvements, but the 
question is how well the Government plays its cards, so to speak. Private companies 
in some parts of the country, like Kiliwater Co. Ltd. in Kilimanjaro and others have 
proved useful in the provision of water supply and water-related services. The recently 
created autonomous water providers like the Urban Water and Sewerage 
Authorities have also showed good performance in the provision of water supply 
and sanitation services. However, privatization without a strong regulatory 
mechanism may prove futile. Privatization in different ways, including divestiture, 
must be based on sound legal and institutional arrangements in order to fulfill its 
mission. Private participation in WSS is not a “panacea” to all problems in the 
water sector. Each case must be judged on its own merits and demerits and the 
most suitable solution must be chosen taking into consideration the peculiarities
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of each situation. There is evidence that, after winning the contracts, private operators 
start looking for ways to re-negotiate the agreements. This is done for various reasons 
but most likely to maximize their profits. This is a standard phenomenon all over the 
world and Tanzania is no exception.
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Acronyms
AfDB  African Development Bank 
AHA  Asset Holding Agency
AIDS  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CBD  Central Business District
CIDA  Canadian Agency for International Development 
DAWASA Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sewerage Authority
DCC  Dar es Salaam City Council
DSSD  Dar es Salaam Sewerage and Sanitation Division 
DTT  Divestiture Technical Committee
EC  European Commission
EU  European Union
EUR  Euro
EWURA  Energy and Water Regulatory Authority
GDP   Gross Domestic Product
GoT  Government of Tanzania
HIPC   Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HIV  Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IEEB  Institute of Environmental Engineering and Biotechnology
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPP   International Professional Partner
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency
MAJI  Ministry of Water and Livestock Development
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MLHHSD  Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlement Development
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MOF  Ministry of Finance
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding
NUWA National Urban Water Authority
PGA  Public Granting Authority 
PPC  Public-private cooperation
PPP  Public-private partnership
PRINWASS Project “Barriers to and conditions for the involvement of private capital 
and enterprise in water supply and sanitation in Latin America and Africa: 
Seeking economic, social and environmental sustainability”
PSRC  Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission 
PSAC  Programmatic Structural Adjustment Credit Programme
PSP  Private sector participation
RWE  Regional Water Engineer
SIP  Supplementary Information Paper
STWI   Severn Trent Water International
SWOT Strengths – Weaknesses – Opportunities – Threats
TAUWSA  Tanga Urban Water and Sewerage Authority 
TUT  Tampere University of Technology
UDSM University of Dar es Salaam
URT  United Republic of Tanzania
UWSAs  Urban Water and Sewerage Authorities 
UWSS  Urban water supply and sanitation
UWSSDs Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Departments
WHO  World Health Organization
WRED  Water Resources Engineering Department
WREP  Water Resources Engineering Programme
WSS  Water and sanitation services
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Appendix 1. Extracts from press reports
1) Extracted from: http://jamboclub.com/investor/page_28.htm. Consulted in January 
2004.
 DAWASA has been performing poorly and inefficiently mainly because of 
mismanagement and lack of capital and technology. Such inadequacies have not only 
resulted into poor services but also other social and hygienic problems. It has been learnt 
that about 32 per cent of infections of communicable diseases are due to contaminated 
water supplies, while 24.7 per cent of the infections are due to poor sewerage. About 80 
per cent of infectious diseases throughout the world are water-borne. 
For developing countries like Tanzania, this problem becomes more difficult because 
treated water may often be contaminated with faecal bacteria during distribution and 
storage due to poor standards of hygiene and sanitation. Statistics show that 68 per cent 
of the city’s low-income households spend about 5 per cent of their monthly income on 
water alone. Only about 10 per cent of the high-income earners fall into this category. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) recommends that a family must not spend more 
than 3 per cent of its monthly income on water and sanitation. It is reported that about 
TSh 14 billion is required for overhauling the Dar es Salaam City’s water networks. 
Analysts say unless the whole main system from the River Ruvu sources is overhauled, 
Dar es Salaam water and sewerage systems will remain problematic. 
In 1999, the Parliament passed a bill to amend the DAWASA Act of 1997. Under the 
revised law, DAWASA will be split up to form a public granting authority (PGA) and a 
private operator (OP). As the asset holding authority, PGA will lease the DAWASA assets 
to the OP, PAG would be given more than Tsh 101.6 billion for its operations, which will 
mainly be to strengthen the Upper Ruvu water systems. The daily water demand for 
Dar es Salaam is 90 million gallons but it currently gets only 60 per cent of this. About 
40 per cent of the water supposedly supplied to the city is lost through preventable 
leakages. Lower Ruvu station, established in 1976, has the capacity to supply some 
40,000 million gallons a day while that of Upper Ruvu station, built in 1956, has the 
capacity to pump some 18 million gallons a day.such a situation, the leasing of DAWASA, 
expected to be ready by the end of this year, is much awaited. At present, Tanzania is 
reviewing its water policy so as to provide clean, safe and adequate water to the public. 
The objective of the new water policy is to improve health and alleviate poverty among 
the rural communities, to improve access to adequate, safe, affordable, and sustainable 
water supply and sanitation services.
2) Extracted from: http://www.randwater.co.za/NewsDetails.asp?NewsID=90. 
Consulted in January 2004.
DAR ES SALAAM - A consortium of British and German firms has won a bid for a 
10-year lease contract to operate a water supply utility in Tanzania’s commercial capital, 
Tanzania’s privatisation agency has announced. Britain’s Biwater International and 
Gauff Ingenieure of Germany will take over the operations of the state-owned Dar es 
Salaam Water and Sewerage
Authority (DAWASA), Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) said in a 
statement released to AFP. “Biwater/Gauff joint venture is now in the process of forming 
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a local operating company to be called City Water Services Limited (CWSL), which will 
involve a local investor taking between 20 and 49 percent shares. “The foreign investors 
have already identified this local investor and are now finalising the legal agreements,” 
the PSRC statement said. PSRC said that DAWASA and CWSL were expected to sign 
contracts in January, once relevant approvals are obtained from the government. The 
move is expected to improve water supply situation to about 3.5 million Dar es Salaam 
residents who had for decades been experiencing serious water shortages due to aged 
and worn out plants and pipe network built in the 1950s. The PSRC statement said that 
Biwater group also runs water companies in South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, 
Chile, Belize and Britain, while Gauff are consulting engineers with extensive experience 
in East Africa.
3) Dawasa set for privatisation. Extracted from: http://www.darhotwire.com/v2/go/
habari/business/20030102/20021230/. Consulted in January 2004.
At least three international institutions, mainly multilateral and bilateral organizations, 
have expressed their readiness to pump a reasonable amount of funds into revamping 
the water supply and sewage systems in Dar es Salaam. If successful, the funding, 
which will go hand-in-hand with the privatisation of the Dar es Salaam Water Supply 
and Sewage Authority (DAWASA), will enable the water managing authority and the 
envisaged new investor, to rehabilitate the infrastructure and extend the service to cover 
new areas in the three Dar Municipalities and some parts of Coast Region. 
 The government has last week concluded a ten-year contract with two international 
water firms, Biwater International of Britain and Gauff Ingenieur of Germany under which 
the two companies will manage the ailing DAWASA. The funding institutions are the 
World Bank, through its International Development Agency (IDA), African Development 
Bank (ADB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). New investors, who are expected 
to take over the Dar water project as of March next year, and DAWASA, will equally 
contribute to the revamping programme, which is to be executed over a five-year period. 
4) TANZANIA: Water privatisation scheme criticized. Extracted from: http://www.
sadocc.at/news2002/2002-199.shtml. Consulted in January 2004. A copy of the original 
can be accessed at: http://www.afrol.com/News2002/tan006_dawasa_private.htm. 
Consulted in May 2018
June 13, 2002
 The government of Tanzania has raised a credit to fund the US$ 145 million upgrade 
of the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA), needed to sell off the 
company at a lower price. Civil society organisations fear that the privatisation deal, one 
of the conditions allowing Tanzania to receive HIPC debt relief will produce higher water 
bills or even become another corruption trap.
The African Development Bank (ADB) has just signed an agreement with the 
Tanzanian government for a loan of approximately US$ 47 million. The missing US$ 98 
million is coming from the World Bank and the European Investment Bank and Agence 
Française de Développement. ADB claims that the project will make affordable clean 
and safe water to the Tanzania’s poor but critics maintain that the proposed investment 
is essentially to ensure that DAWASA is attractive to potential buyers. 
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has insisted on privatising DAWASA for about 
five years but the process of selecting the private operator has been plagued by scandal 
and controversy. The first bidding process was stopped after two French companies, 
Saur International and Vivendi were rejected. Now the government says privatisation 
of DAWASA will be “done in two stages”. Loans totalling US$ 145m will be committed 
during the first stage. DAWASA will then be leased to a private operator for 10 years. 
The winning bidder will contribute only US$ 6.5 million towards the ‘costs of meters 
and standpipes’ - prompting the governmental US Commercial Service to describe 
DAWASA as one of the most “significant investment opportunities” in Tanzania in its 
latest country report. 
8 companies have made their submissions in the re-bid process, including 3 from 
France, Germany and the UK. This may explain the co-financing from the European 
Investment Bank and Agence Française de Développement; institutions not normally 
engaged in Tanzania. After the first stage, “the privatisation status of DAWASA will then 
change from lease to concession”, says the Tanzanian water ministry. The privatisation 
of Tanzania’s water company comes hot on the heals of last month’s scandal over the 
Tanzania Electricity Supply Company (Tanesco). A small South African engineering firm, 
NET Group Solutions won the contract only to be exposed as lacking the capacity to 
handle Tanzania’s national electricity grid. Then scandal turned to farce when the East 
African Newspaper revealed that the firm’s Tanzanian partner was a company owned 
by President Benjamin Mkapa’s brother-in-law, which included ‘primary school children 
as directors!’ After the scandal, the government rejected a parliamentary demand to 
reveal the details of Tanesco’s management contract. The privatisation process now 
continues in secret with full compliance by the IMF and World Bank, the ADB and the 
European Investment Bank and Agence Française de Développement. 
5) Extracted from: http://www.ippmedia.com/ft/features.asp. Consulted in January 
2004.
On privatization options, the public has accepted in principle that it would be a good 
idea to privatize utility companies like TANESCO, DAWASA, TRC, THA by way of lease 
to more competent operators. They have also welcomed the move to form regulatory 
bodies for privatized companies to protect the interests of consumers, the government 
and the operators. The public is expecting cheaper utilities which are delivered more 
reliably after a private operator starts to manage TANESCO and DAWASA. They do 
not expect expensive and unreliable supplies of water and electricity to industries and 
residences. 
The issue of privatization option has become controversial after it was announced 
that NMB would be privatised and strategic investors would take 51 percent of the 
shares and the government would retain 49 percent while 2 percent would be sold to 
local investors. 
6) DAWASA sabotaged, The Express, by Jacqueline Mujuni and Fred Okumu
Extracted from: http://www.theexpress.com/express%20267/news/news2.htm#1 
and http://www.theexpress.com/express%20267/. Consulted in January 2004.
CALL it a camera trick or optic illusion. Just as the privatisation of the Dar es Salaam 
Water and Sanitation Authority (DAWASA) is in the pipeline, the sabotage machinery is 
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in full swing. And it isn’t verbal as people are used to. This time, the rumour machine has 
turned to the information superhighway. Two photographs, one displaying a horrific scene 
of a crocodile, purportedly taken from DAWASA transmission pipes two weeks ago, is 
horrific. A second photograph shows a pipe full of snakes. An accompanying message 
with the photo says, “Look what we surveyors have to watch out for”, punctuated with 
exclamation marks. The photos, The Express has learnt, have been distributed over the 
Internet, and no doubt, by virtue of the scope of the information superhighway, it has 
reached millions of people in the world.
But yesterday, the DAWASA Director of Water Supply Boniphace Kasiga disowned 
the photographs saying they were not from the water utility nor taken along its 
transmission pipes from Ruvu River, from either Lower or Upper Ruvu. DAWASA has 
used the Ruvu River as its main water source since the 1950s. The Upper Ruvu scheme 
has a present capacity of about 81 Mld (millions of litres per day), while the Lower Ruvu 
scheme has a design capacity of 182 Mld. Other sources, which are being used, are at 
Mtoni to the south of the city with a capacity of about 9 Mld, and ground water. The 
DAWASA area of supply covers not only the city but also the villages and townships on 
the route of the two transmission mains. The approximate length of existing mains in 
the city is about 824 km, with 237 km of primary distribution and 587 km of secondary 
distribution mains. Speaking at his office in an exclusive interview, Kasiga said that 
the photographs were not from DAWASA sources. “We do the surveys ourselves and 
we have never hired any company,” he informed. He explained that the photos showed 
Europeans as surveyors when DAWASA has no Europeans on its staff. “I have got the 
photo,” he said adding: “One of the workers with DAWASA had even pasted the photos 
on the wall of his office.” Investigation by The Express revealed that the circulation of 
the photographs is a special ploy designed to sabotage DAWASA and therefore reduce 
its value before privatisation. “It could be one of the potential bidders who is circulating 
the false photos,” a source told this paper on Monday. DAWASA, vested with the task 
of caring about water and sewerage in December 19, 1999 after the dissolution of the 
NUWA, was formerly under the Dar es Salaam City Council. An expert analysis of the 
photographs by water engineers revealed near zero possibility of a live animal entering 
the water supply system. Speaking at the University of Dar es Salaam on Tuesday, Prof. 
Felix Mtalo of the Departments of Water Resources Engineering said: “It is impossible 
for a large animal to get inside the pipes due to the high pressure of the water inside.” 
He however said that foreign matters like fine particles of sand could enter the pipes 
through leakages. The DAWASA director clarified that the Department of Water in the 
Ministry of Water and Livestock always monitors the water quality. They always take 
samples from various sections of the water supply system, he said, adding that even 
then, consumers are advised to ensure that the water they use is boiled. The water in 
the supply system is chlorinated, but during the handling process, may be in buckets, 
the water may be inadvertently polluted, he said. The director also vehemently crashed 
the statement by Prof. Mtalo that the filtration system on the lower Ruvu Water Supply 
system at Bagamoyo has been out of order for the past five years. “It is working”, said 
Kasiga confidently. The strategy for the re-bid process is to identify a private operator 
to enter into a ten-year lease contract for the provision of water supply and sewerage 
services. The private operator will also be expected to carry out sizeable construction 
activities during the early years of the lease. Pre-qualified bidders are Biwater of the UK 
with Gauff of Germany, General des Eaux of France and Saur International of France. 
According to the timetable by the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission 
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(PSRC), the winning bidder is to take over operations of DAWASA by March 2003.
7) INVITATION FOR PREQUALIFICATION DAR ES SALAAM WATER AND SEWERAGE 
AUTHORITY (DAWASA)                       
DIVESTITURE THROUGH A TEN-YEAR LEASE CONTRACT 
Extracted from: http://www.psrctz.com/Advertised%20Opportunities/Invitation%20
-%20Preq%20DAWASA.htm. Consulted in January 2004.
  The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania has applied for a credit from the 
International Development Association (IDA) towards the cost of improving the water 
supply and sanitation services in the area currently served by DAWASA. It is intended 
that part of the proceeds of this credit will be used for eligible payments under a ten-year 
lease contract between DAWASA and the Private Operator for the provision of water 
supply and sewerage services. It is expected that the Private Operator will be responsible 
for managing sizeable delegated construction works during the early years of the 
lease. The Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission intends to pre-qualify 
International Water Operators (IWOs) and/or consortia of IWOs and contractors to bid 
for the lease contract to operate and maintain the water supply and sewerage systems 
in Greater Dar es Salaam.  
Prequalification will be conducted through prequalification procedures set out in the 
World Bank’s Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, January 1995 
(revised January and August 1996, September 1997 and January 1999) and is open to all 
bidders from eligible source countries, as defined in the guidelines. 
Interested eligible bidders may obtain further information from and inspect the Pre-
qualification Documents at the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission at 
the address below from 15 November 2000 between 8.00 to 17.00 hours Monday to 
Friday.  A complete set of prequalification documents in English may be purchased 
by interested bidders on the submission of a written application to the address below 
and upon payment of a non-refundable fee of TSh 80,000 or US$ 100. The method 
of payment will be either cash or banker’s draft in the name of Presidential Parastatal 
Sector Reform Commission.  The document will be sent by courier. 
Applications for prequalification should be submitted in sealed envelopes, delivered 
to the address below by 3 January 2001 and marked clearly “Application to Prequalify 
for the Lease Contract for the Water Supply and Sewerage Services in Dar es Salaam”.  
  
The Executive Chairman 
Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission 
2nd Floor, Sukari House 
Sokoine Drive/Ohio Street 
PO Box 9252 
Dar es Salaam 
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